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REMIC TAX ENFORCEMENT AS FINANCIAL-
MARKET REGULATOR 
Bradley T. Borden & David J. Reiss* 
Lawmakers, prosecutors, homeowners, policymakers, investors, 
news media, scholars and other commentators have examined, litigated, 
and reported on the role that residential mortgage-backed securities 
(RMBS) played in the 2008 financial crisis.  Big banks create RMBS by 
pooling mortgage notes into trusts and selling interests in those trusts.  
Absent from prior work related to RMBS securitization is the tax treatment 
of RMBS mortgage-note pools and the critical role tax enforcement should 
play in ensuring the integrity of mortgage-note securitization. 
This article examines federal tax aspects of RMBS mortgage-note 
pools formed in the years leading up to the financial crisis.  Tax law 
provides favorable tax treatment to real estate mortgage investment 
conduits (REMICs), a type of RMBS pool.  To qualify for the favorable 
REMIC tax treatment, an RMBS pool must meet several requirements 
relating to the ownership and quality of mortgage notes.  The practices of 
loan originators and RMBS organizers in the years leading up to the 
financial crisis have jeopardized the tax classification of a significant 
portion of the RMBS pools.  Nonetheless, the IRS appears to believe that 
there is no legal or policy basis for challenging REMIC classification of 
even the worst RMBS pools.  This article takes issue with the IRS’s 
inaction and presents both the legal and policy grounds for enforcing tax 
law by challenging the REMIC classification of at least the worst types of 
RMBS pools.  The article urges the IRS to take action, recognizing that its 
failure to police these arrangements prior to the financial crisis is partly to 
blame for the economic meltdown in 2008.  The IRS’s continued failure to 
police RMBS arrangements provides latitude to industry participants to 
facilitate future economic catastrophes.  Even where the IRS does not take 
action, private parties can rely upon the blueprint set forth in the article to 
 
* Brad and David are Professors of Law at Brooklyn Law School. They thank Emily 
Berman, Anita Bernstein, Dana Brakman Reiser, Neil Cohen, Steve Dean, Ted Janger, Steve 
Landsman, and Alan Lederman for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. They 
also thank Orly Graber and Tobias Schad for excellent research assistance. © 2013 Bradley 
T. Borden & David J. Reiss. 
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bring qui tam or whistleblower claims to accomplish the purposes of the 
REMIC rules and obtain the beneficial results that would occur if the IRS 
enforced the REMIC rules.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
When real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs) operate 
in the Congressionally-sanctioned manner, they drive capital to residential 
real estate markets and help provide liquidity to all classes of homeowners.  
That capital makes homeownership a reality for people who may not 
otherwise be able to purchase a home.  It also fuels economic growth.  
Unfortunately, in the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, REMIC 
sponsors disregarded Congressional mandates, labeling unqualified 
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arrangements as “REMICs.”  REMIC organizers (including loan 
originators, underwriters, and sponsors) knowingly originated and pooled 
problematic mortgage notes to form residential-mortgage backed securities 
(RMBS).  RMBS pools thus included mortgage notes signed by 
uninformed and unqualified borrowers with insufficient collateral to ensure 
repayment.  Having established these purported REMICs, the organizers 
then misrepresented their quality to investors. 
REMIC organizers’ practices were an integral part of the financial 
debacle that brought the multi-trillion dollar real estate finance industry to 
its knees.  In fact, the practices literally brought the U.S. Treasury to its 
knees as Secretary Hank Paulson pled with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to 
keep her party on board with the 2008 federal government bailout designed 
to address the financial crisis.1  REMIC organizers’ practices also crippled 
the world economy.  If the IRS had enforced the REMIC rules, it would 
have deterred the unsavory practices of REMIC organizers, which most 
likely would have helped prevent or at least reduce the magnitude of the 
financial crisis.  Now the IRS must take action and collect the revenues to 
which the government is legally entitled. 
REMICs are the result of mortgage securitization—the process of 
pooling illiquid assets, such as mortgage notes, into an RMBS pool (often 
structured as a state-law trust) and selling securities in the pool to investors.  
The securitization process requires several steps.  Loan originators such as 
local banks lend money in exchange for mortgage notes and mortgages.  
They then sell the mortgage notes and mortgages to an RMBS sponsor.  
The RMBS sponsor gathers hundreds of mortgage notes and mortgages 
from loan originators and transfers them to an RMBS trust in exchange for 
interests in the trust.  The sponsor then sells the RMBS to investors.  If an 
RMBS trust satisfies several requirements, it will qualify as a REMIC and 
receive favorable tax treatment.2 
Congress designed the REMIC requirements to ensure that only 
high-quality mortgage notes enter RMBS pools that seek REMIC 
classification.  By failing to securitize only high-quality mortgage notes in 
REMICs, RMBS sponsors violated tax law on a wide scale.  The IRS 
would have uncovered such violations if it had audited REMICs.  Early 
detection of violations through tax enforcement would have deterred much 
of the behavior that is responsible for the financial crisis.  The IRS’s failure 
 
 1.  Liz Wolgemuth, Hank Paulson: Kneeling Before Pelosi, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 
(Sept. 26, 2008), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/the-inside-job/2008/09/26/hank-
paulson-kneeling-before-pelosi (explaining that “Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson 
reportedly kneeled before House Speaker Nancy Pelosi last night in a bid to keep her party 
on board with the bailout package.”). 
 2.  See infra Part II (explaining the requirements under the I.R.C. to become an 
REMIC). 
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to audit REMICs and enforce the REMIC rules thus allowed practices to 
deteriorate and helped to cause the financial crisis.  The IRS should now 
take action by challenging the classification of at least certain types of 
REMICs.  Such actions would add to government revenues, put mortgage 
securitizers on notice that they must comply with congressional mandates, 
reestablish the IRS’s role as an impartial enforcer of federal tax statutes, 
and guide the tax bar as it advises financial institutions about the 
requirements for REMICs. 
The significant amount of litigation that followed the RMBS 
collapse has exposed a number of unsavory lending and securitization 
practices that led to the financial crisis.3  In these legal battles, banks and 
RMBS sponsors have found themselves in the crosshairs of not only RMBS 
investors and government agencies but also homeowners.  Homeowners 
and borrowers fight foreclosure and bankruptcy claims in downstream 
litigation; RMBS investors and prosecutors sue RMBS sponsors in 
upstream litigation.4  In downstream litigation, homeowners challenge 
claims of parties who attempt to foreclose on property or bring a claim in 
bankruptcy.  The results of downstream RMBS litigation are mixed both 
from a legal and contextual perspective.  In some jurisdictions, courts rule 
in favor of homeowners and estop purported mortgage holders from 
foreclosing on property or participating in bankruptcy proceedings.5  In 
other jurisdictions, courts allow purported mortgage holders to proceed 
with foreclosures or participate in bankruptcy proceedings.6  States have 
also filed lawsuits against lenders and other financial institutions in the 
mortgage industry claiming unfair and otherwise inappropriate lending and 
foreclosure practices.7  The results of some of these actions appear in 
headlines reporting settlements between states and financial institutions 
 
 3.  See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INQUIRY REPORT (2011) (breaking down the official government report of the financial 
crisis);  see also John M. Griffin & Gonzalo Maturana, Who Facilitated Misreporting in 
Securitized Loans? (Working Paper, Dec. 20, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256060 
(examining prevalence of four misrepresentation indicators in private-label RMBS). 
 4.  REFINBLOG, http://refinblog.com (presenting and summarizing both downstream 
and upstream litigation matters). 
 5.  See id. (reviewing the current landscape in upstream and downstream litigation). 
 6.  See id. (recognizing the different treatment of litigation in jurisdictions). 
 7.  See, e.g., Complaint, New York v. J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, No. 451556/2012 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Oct. 10, 2012) (filing by New York Attorney General against J.P. 
Morgan for fraudulent and deceptive acts in promoting and selling MBS); Press Release, 
Lender Processing Services, Inc., Lender Processing Services Announces Multi-State 
Attorneys General Settlement; Significant Civil Litigation Also Resolved (Jan. 31, 2013), 
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/lender-processing-services-announces-multi-
140000279.html (announcing settlement over robo-signing allegations “with the attorneys 
general of 46 states and the District of Columbia”). 
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that total many billions of dollars.8 
In upstream RMBS litigation, RMBS investors sue for various 
types of wrongdoing on the part of financial institutions.  Investors claim 
that financial institutions did not properly disclose their liability exposure, 
that mortgage securitizations did not proceed as represented in offering 
materials and required by pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs), and 
that RMBS sponsors misrepresented facts about the ownership and quality 
of pooled mortgages.9  Much of the upstream litigation is in its early stages 
but involves astronomical sums of money.  Figure 1 summarizes the 
litigation landscape in this area. 
 
The financial crisis has been written about from many angles, but 
this article is the first to approach it from the perspective of tax policy.  It 
illustrates that law and policy do not support REMIC classification of 
numerous RMBS pools.  The article suggests that had the IRS enforced 
statutory requirements for REMICs, it could have helped prevent the 
financial crisis.  After analyzing multiple questions of first impression that 
the courts will face in resolving RMBS litigation, this article concludes that 
even today the IRS could and should take action against REMICs that 
clearly violate the REMIC rules. 
 
 8.  See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz & Shaila Dewan, States Negotiate $26 Billion 
Agreement for Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2012, at A1. 
 9.  See infra Part I.D (citing examples of upstream litigation regarding the 
misrepresentations made by RMBS sponsors). 
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Part I of the article recounts the history of the RMBS industry and 
the role of REMIC classification in that industry.  The discussion reveals 
that policymakers and commentators support mortgage-note securitization 
because it provides greater liquidity to residential mortgage lenders, 
reduces the cost of borrowing, and makes homeownership available to a 
broader cross-section of the population.  Congress enacted the REMIC 
rules to facilitate mortgage securitization by providing tax-favored 
treatment to RMBS structures that satisfied several requirements.  That 
favorable treatment was tailored to RMBS structures and securitization 
processes that were common at the time.  Following the enactment of the 
REMIC rules, however, lending and securitization practices began to 
change.  Leading up to the financial crisis, those practices ceased to satisfy 
the applicable requirements.   
Part II provides the legal basis for challenging the REMIC 
classification of many RMBS arrangements.  Comparing the rules of 
REMIC classification to actual securitization practices in the years leading 
up to the financial crisis reveals that many RMBS arrangements that held 
themselves out as REMICs could not satisfy the REMIC requirements.  
This analysis discredits claims of commentators and government officials 
who argue that there are no good legal or policy reasons for challenging the 
tax classification of purported REMICs.10 
Part III presents the policy reasons for challenging REMIC 
classification.  Congress enacted the REMIC rules to apply to a very 
specific type of mortgage-note pool.  The requirements are grounded in 
sound tax policy and the IRS should be duty-bound to enforce the rules.  
Granting favorable tax treatment to RMBS arrangements that fail to adhere 
to those rules undermines Congressional intent and the sound policy that 
supports the rules.  Failure to enforce the rules has allowed parties to 
siphon significant tax revenue from government coffers.  The failure to 
audit purported REMICs has also empowered REMIC organizers to engage 
in practices that led to the financial crisis.  Continued failure to act in this 
area will provide continued opportunities for such practices.  IRS inaction 
also justifies the tax bar’s poor work in this area, making the call to action 
all the more urgent.  The IRS has an obligation to act to thwart the type of 
behavior that brought the world economy to its knees.   
 
 10.  See, e.g., Joshua Stein, Dirt Lawyers Versus Wall Street: A Different View, 27 
PROB. & PROP. MAG. 6 (2013), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/probate_property_magazine_2012/2013/november
_december_2013/letters_to_the_editor.html (showing the need to challenge the tax 
classifications and the benefits of doing so); John W. Rogers III, Tax Issues Involving 
Flawed Securitizations, Sales, Exchanges & Basis Committee Meeting, A.B.A. SEC. TAX’N 
(Orlando), Jan. 26, 2013. 
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I. OVERVIEW OF RMBS INDUSTRY AND ROLE OF REMICS 
For generations, Americans who wanted to buy a home would 
typically contact a local thrift institution, like a savings and loan or bank, 
and speak to a loan officer who would evaluate their applications.11  Under 
those conditions, reserve requirements and balance sheet restrictions 
limited the amount of money institutions could lend.12  The system stifled 
growth by limiting the amount of cash available to lend to potential 
homeowners.13  Limited amounts of cash drove up interest rates, making 
homeownership available only to people with prime financial profiles.14  
Thus, traditional financing practice needed innovation to make home 
ownership possible for a larger segment of society.  The solution appeared 
to lie with Wall Street. 
A. Origins of the RMBS Market 
Wall Street investors historically viewed home loans as riskier 
investments than other assets because mortgages are regulated by a 
patchwork of local and state laws and are tied to local economies.15 A local 
recession or natural disaster could increase defaults and decrease the value 
of a portfolio of geographically concentrated mortgages.  These conditions 
kept Wall Street investors out of the residential mortgage market.  To help 
create more liquidity for lenders and homebuyers, the federal government 
began considering mortgage securitization as a possible source of greater 
liquidity in the late 1960s.16 Securitizations were carefully structured to 
achieve precise tax, accounting, and regulatory treatment to make them 
attractive to Wall Street investors.  To help reduce risks associated with 
local economies, the pool of mortgages were drawn from diverse 
 
 11.  David J. Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory 
Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 992-93 
(2005). 
 12.  See generally Jerome F. Festa, Introduction to PATRICK D. DOLAN & C. VANLEER 
DAVIS III, SECURITIZATIONS: LEGAL & REGULATORY ISSUES 1-1 (2013) (discussing the 
evolution of securitization). 
 13.  See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
ASSET SECURITIZATION, § 1.2 (3d ed.) (describing “capital shortage” and the need for 
“alternative capital streams”). 
 14.  Reiss, supra note11, at 992-93. 
15.   See id. at 1001, for a discussion of the history of RMBS. 
16.   Then-Housing and Urban Development Secretary George Romney championed the 
mortgage securitization movement.  John C. Weicher, Setting GSE Policy through Charters, 
Laws, and Regulations, in SERVING TWO MASTERS, YET OUT OF CONTROL: FANNIE MAE AND 
FREDDIE MAC 120, 131-32 (Peter J. Wallison ed., 2001). 
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locations.17  Interests in these pools of mortgages were dubbed residential 
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). 
The most important factor in the development of the RMBS market 
was the creation of two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs):  Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac.  Fannie Mae created a secondary market for certain 
loans prior to 1970, but the RMBS market began in earnest with the 
passage of the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 (EHFA), which 
allowed GSEs to purchase and securitize conforming mortgages.  Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac set up standardized procedures for the creation and 
management of RMBS pools, and guaranteed the timely payment of 
principal and interest on the securities backed by the loans in the pool.18  
GSEs only securitized conforming loans—those meeting strict standards 
related to the borrower’s creditworthiness and the value of the collateral.19 
Securitizations in the 1970s involved direct pass-through securities 
for which investors received a mortgage-note pool’s cash flow in 
proportion to their ownership of securities in the pool.20  Thus, a person 
who owned five percent of the pool’s securities would receive five percent 
of the cash flow from each mortgage and be taxed accordingly.  In the late 
1970s, “the primary condition” necessary for the explosion of RMBS 
securitization came about: “a funding shortfall.”21  That is, the strong desire 
for home ownership and the rapid escalation of housing prices created a 
demand for residential mortgages that the local lending institutions could 
not meet.  Wall Street firms responded. 
Starting sporadically in the late 1970s, issuers unrelated to the 
federal government, such as commercial banks and mortgage companies, 
began to issue RMBS.  These “private label” securities did not have the 
governmental or quasi-governmental guarantee that a federally-related 
issuer such as a GSE would give, and they are typically backed by 
nonconforming loans.  Private-label securitization gained momentum 
during the savings and loan crisis in the early 1980s.  Wall Street firms 
identified “a unique opportunity to profit from the thrift crisis by proffering 
 
17.   Reiss, supra note11, at 1004. 
18.   David Reiss, The Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac’s Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1073 
(2008). 
 19.  See id. at 1032 (outlining the standards that must be met to qualify as a conforming 
loan). 
 20.  See JOHN FRANCIS HILSON & JEFFREY S. TURNER, ASSET-BASED LENDING: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SECURED FINANCING, § 2:6.2 (2000) (presenting different forms of 
funding practices used by vehicles to purchase or finance receivables, including pass-
through funding). 
 21.  Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New Era in American Finance, in A PRIMER ON 
SECURITIZATION 1, 6 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996). 
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the securitization exit strategy as the solution to the thrifts’ residential 
portfolio dilemma.”22  Issuers of these private-label securities were less 
regulated and less consistent than Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac when it 
came to creating and managing their products.  Nonetheless, private-label 
RMBS faced a serious impediment to their growth that arose from their tax 
treatment. 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the tax classification and 
treatment of the mortgage-note pools stymied the growth of the RMBS 
industry.  RMBS sponsors could structure mortgage-note pools as 
investment trusts, which required the pools to remain constant and the 
investors to have interests in the underlying mortgages that were 
proportionate to their interests in the trust.23  Consequently, the trust 
generally could issue only one class or type of security.24  If the RMBS 
pool was an investment trust, the interest income from the loans would 
flow through to the investors without the trust incurring any tax liability.25  
The proportionate ownership requirement, however, prohibited the RMBS 
pool from issuing different classes (or tranches) of interests without 
becoming a taxable entity.26  Thus, RMBS sponsors had to choose between 
a single-tranche flow-through mortgage pool and a multiple-tranche taxable 
mortgage-pool. 
Leaving the tax drawbacks aside, the financial benefits of multiple-
tranche mortgage-note pools are significant.  A multiple-tranche mortgage-
note pool creates RMBS interests with different risk profiles.  For instance, 
the mortgage-note pool over-collateralizes the highest-rated tranche and 
pays the holders of that tranche first.  If the trust has sufficient proceeds, it 
pays the holders of all of the tranches.  If borrowers begin to default, 
however, the trust may not be able to fully pay the obligations of all the 
tranches.  Thus, the lower-rated tranches are riskier and pay a higher 
interest rate.  The ability to provide tranches with different risk profiles 
makes RMBS attractive to a broader swathe of investors and adds more 
capital to the residential mortgage market.  And most importantly, if rating 
agencies rate the least risky tranches in a multiple-tranche pool as 
 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c)(1) (as amended in 1996) (defining investment 
trusts). 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  I.R.C. §§ 671–679 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.671-2(e)(1), (3) (2013); see I.R.S. Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 34,347 (Sept. 14, 1970) (demonstrating that tax law treats investment trusts as 
grantor trusts). 
 26.  JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX 
REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 407 (1987) [hereinafter 1986 Bluebook]. 
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“investment-grade,” those tranches can be eligible for purchase by a range 
of institutional investors.27 
As noted, the problem with the multiple-tranche RMBS structure in 
the 1970s and 1980s was that it would not qualify for flow-through 
taxation.28  Consequently, a multiple-tranche RMBS trust would have been 
treated as a taxable corporation and subject to tax on interest earned on 
loans;29 interests in such a trust might have been equity and not debt, so 
payments to holders might not have been deductible,30 and RMBS holders 
would have had to pay tax on payments that they received.31  Thus, the tax 
aspects of multiple-tranche RMBS structures made them unattractive to 
investors. 
Congress was concerned about granting favorable tax treatment to 
multiple-tranche RMBS structures because the cash inflows and outflows 
and the interest income and deductions of such structures do not match.32  
Because the risk profile and date to maturity of the tranches vary, the 
interest rate for the tranches varies, and the RMBS trust and RMBS 
investors recognize interest income at different times under the rules 
governing original issue discount.33  Even if the income of RMBS holders 
and the RMBS trust equalized over time, that durational difference could 
deprive the federal government of the time-value-of-money related to the 
delayed tax payments on the interest income of the junior tranche 
investors.34  Congress needed to solve this delay problem before it would 
grant flow-through treatment to multiple-tranche RMBS trusts. 
 
 27.  See generally STANDARD & POOR’S GUIDE TO CREDIT RATING ESSENTIALS (2011), 
available at http://img.en25.com/Web/StandardandPoors/SP_CreditRatingsGuide.pdf 
(discussing the relationship between credit ratings and tranches). 
 28.  1986 Bluebook, supra note 26, at 407; see also Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c)(1) (as 
amended in 1996) (stating that “[a]n ‘investment’ trust will not be classified as a trust if 
there is a power under the trust agreement to vary the investment of the certificate 
holders. . . . An investment trust with multiple classes of ownership interests ordinarily will 
be classified as a [corporation].”). 
 29.  See I.R.C. § 11(a) (2012) (imposing a tax on corporate income). 
 30.  See I.R.C. § 163(a) (2012) (allowing a deduction for interest payment, but no 
similar deduction exists for dividend payments). 
 31.  See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (2012) (stating that income from dividends contributes to 
gross income). 
 32.  1986 Bluebook, supra note 26, at 411-12; see Kirk Van Brunt, Tax Aspects of 
REMIC Residual Interests, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 149, 154–156 (1994) (describing the mismatch 
between cash flows and taxes). 
 33.  See Van Brunt, supra note 32, at 211–18 (explaining why investors recognize 
interest income at different times). 
 34.  See id. at 154–56, 184–85 (describing the timing difference). 
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Congress solved the problem with the REMIC rules by providing 
that REMICs must have only regular interests and residual interests.35  The 
regular interest holders had to recognize interest income under the accrual 
method, taking into account any original issue discount in their interests.36  
The residual interest holders, on the other hand, had to recognize an 
amount of income (or loss) necessary to account for income not recognized 
by the regular interest holders, known as phantom income (or loss).37  The 
holders of residual interests generally recognized phantom income early in 
the life of the RMBS trust and phantom loss in the later years.38  Even if the 
income and loss offset each other, the timing difference gave residual 
interests negative value.39  To account for that income, an RMBS trust had 
to compute and estimate the performance of the loans on the formation of 
the RMBS trust, and the trust assets had to remain static throughout the life 
of the trust to give such computations and estimations meaning.40  Figure 2, 
below, illustrates why the interest of the RMBS trust does not match 
interest income of the RMBS investors. 
 
 35.  See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 26, at 412 (noting that “[h]olders of ‘regular 
interests’ generally take into income that portion of the income of the REMIC that would be 
recognized by an accrual method holder of a debt instrument that had the same terms as the 
particular regular interest; holders of ‘residual interests’ take into account all of the net 
income of the REMIC that is not taken into account by the holders of the regular interests”); 
Bruce Kayle, Where Has All the Income Gone? The Mysterious Relocation of Interest and 
Principal in Coupon Stripping and Related Transactions, 7 VA. TAX REV. 303, 348 (1987) 
(providing that “[h]olders of residual interests take into account the difference between the 
income generated by the REMIC’s assets and the amount of income taken into account by 
the holders of regular interests”). 
 36.  See I.R.C § 860B(b) (2012) (requiring the use of the accrual method); I.R.C § 
1272(a)(6) (2012) (applying special accrual rules to regular interest investors). 
 37.  See I.R.C. §§ 860C(a), 860E(a) (2012) (requiring that the residual interest holder’s 
income be no less than the excess inclusion [“phantom income”] for the year). 
 38.  See Van Brunt, supra note 32, at 211-14. 
 39.  Id. at 203. 
 40.  See I.R.C. § 1272(a)(6)(A) (2012) (providing that the daily accruals would derive 
in part from the present value of remaining payments under a debt instrument—either the 
RMBS or the mortgage note); Treas. Reg. § 1.860D-1(d)(2)(ii)-(iii) (2013) (requiring a 
REMIC to report the following on the tax return for its first taxable year:  information about 
the terms and conditions of the regular and residual interests and a description about the 
prepayment and reinvestment assumptions that the REMIC uses for purposes of I.R.C. § 
1272); see also 1986 Bluebook, supra note 26, at 426 ( “Congress intended that such 
prepayment assumption will be determined by the assumed rate of prepayments on qualified 
mortgages held by the REMIC and also the assumed rate of earnings on the temporary 
investment of payments on such mortgages insofar as such rate of earnings would affect the 
timing of payments on regular interests. The Congress intended that the Treasury 
regulations will require these pricing assumptions to be specified in the first partnership 
return filed by the REMIC.”). 
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As part of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Congress provided that 
RMBS trusts that account for phantom income and loss are not subject to 
corporate taxation, but qualify for flow-through taxation.41  The static-asset 
requirement goes beyond merely limiting the transfer of mortgage notes 
into and out of an RMBS trust.  It also supports a fairly accurate assessment 
of the value of the mortgage notes in a pool and the likelihood that 
borrowers will make timely payments on their loans.  Factors such as the 
borrower’s creditworthiness, the value of the borrower’s collateral, the 
occupancy status of the collateral, and the trust’s right and ability to 
foreclose on the collateral affect the value of the mortgage notes in a given 
pool and the likelihood and timeliness of payments.42  Consequently, 
Congress imposed strict trust asset requirements that multiple-tranche 
RMBS trusts must satisfy in order to qualify for REMIC flow-through 
treatment.43  RMBS trusts that fail to satisfy these requirements cannot 
accurately compute the income of the RMBS holders and can thereby 
siphon revenues from government coffers by using REMIC flow-through 
 
 41.  See I.R.C. § 860A (2012) (describing the taxation of REMICs). 
 42.  See e.g., Griffin & Maturana, supra note 3 (identifying the negative impact on 
payments of unreported second liens, inflated appraisals, misrepresentation of owner 
occupancy, and flipping); State-Level Guarantee Fee Pricing, 77 Fed. Reg. 58991, 58991 
(proposed Sept. 25, 2012) (noting “the exceptionally high costs” incurred “in cases of 
mortgage default in [certain] states”). 
 43.  See I.R.C. §§ 860D, 860G (2012) (defining a REMIC); see also infra Part III. 
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taxation.44  Consequently, any RMBS trust that neither meets the REMIC 
requirements nor is an investment trust must be taxed as a corporation.45 
Following the Tax Reform Act of 1986, multiple-tranche 
mortgage-note pools could take the favored tax status of a REMIC if they 
satisfied the REMIC requirements.  At the time Congress created the 
REMIC rules, RMBS sponsors appeared to take appropriate measures to 
ensure that they had satisfied the REMIC requirements.  REMIC status 
revolutionized the RMBS industry.  Between 1986 and 2008, REMICs 
became a significant part of the RMBS market.  As of the end of 2011, 
purported REMICs held more than $3 trillion in assets.46  That value was 
about a quarter of all U.S. residential mortgages and a third of all 
securitized mortgages.47 
A simplified version of the securitization process in 1986 illustrates 
how mortgage notes and mortgages moved to REMICs at the time 
Congress created the REMIC rules.  First, an originator lent money to a 
borrower.  The borrower signed a mortgage note for the amount of the loan 
and a mortgage granting the lender a security interest in the loan.  As part 
of this step, the lender recorded the mortgage with the county clerk.48  
Second, the originator entered into a PSA with a sponsor and trustee.  
Pursuant to the agreement, the originator sold the mortgage note and 
mortgage to a REMIC sponsor for cash.49  If the mortgage note was a 
bearer instrument, the originator transferred it by transferring possession of 
the mortgage note; otherwise, the originator endorsed the note and 
transferred possession of it.50  As part of the second step, the REMIC 
 
 44.  Miscalculations may result in understated phantom income of the residual interest 
holders.  This could occur if the fair market value of the mortgage notes in the pool is less 
than the value that the RMBS organizers claim it is.  The overstated value would cause the 
trust to report less gross income than otherwise required under the rules governing original 
issue discount.  That underreporting would understate the amount of phantom income that 
the residual interest holders would report in the early years of the RMBS. 
 45.  See I.R.C. § 7701(i) (2012) (treating taxable mortgage pools as tax corporations); 
1986 Bluebook, supra note 26, at 411 (stating that “[t]he Congress believed that this vehicle 
should be the exclusive vehicle (accompanied by exclusive tax consequences) relating to the 
issuance of multiple class mortgage-back securities, and that availability of other vehicles 
should be limited to the extent possible.”). 
 46.  Amended Complaint at 36, Knights of Columbus v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 
651442/2011 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Aug. 16, 2011) (citing Scot J. Paltrow, IRS Weighs Tax 
Penalties on Mortgage Securities, REUTERS, Apr. 27, 2011, http://reut.rs/kPqOnE). 
 47.  See Federal Housing Finance Agency, Enterprise Share of Residential Mortgage 
Debt Outstanding, 1990-2010, FHFA.GOV, http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=70 
(providing residential mortgage data in the United States). 
 48.  See generally 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 37.28 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 
2013) (describing the mortgage priority rules). 
 49.  See Reiss, supra note 11, at 1003 (describing the securitization process). 
 50.  See WOLF, supra note 48, § 37.27 (describing the transferability of the interests of 
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sponsor recorded the transfer of the mortgage note and mortgage.51  Third, 
after the REMIC sponsor acquired a pool of mortgage notes and mortgages, 
it transferred them to a REMIC trust in exchange for the beneficial interests 
in the trust.52  The REMIC trust had no managers, so its trustee recorded the 
transfer of the mortgage note and mortgages with the county clerk.53  
Fourth, the sponsor sold the beneficial interests in the REMIC trust to 
investors.54  Figure 3 illustrates the traditional RMBS securitization process 
from its inception in the 1970s until the 1990s. 
 
 
 
the mortgagee). 
 51.  See id. 
 52.  See PATRICK D. DOLAN & C. VANLEER DAVIS III, SECURITIZATIONS: LEGAL & 
REGULATORY ISSUES § 4.02 (providing a short description of the typical structure of 
securitization trusts). 
 53.  See JASON H.P. KRAVITT, SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS § 9.02 (2012) 
(describing the duties of the trustee in order to comply with securitization transaction 
requirements). 
 54.  See DOLAN & DAVIS, supra note 52, § 4.02[2d-f] (discussing the tax issues of 
securitization). 
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B. Mortgage Securitization with MERS 
The process of assigning mortgages was universally cumbersome 
until the end of the twentieth century.  Each assignment from originator to 
sponsor or from sponsor to mortgage-note pool was recorded in the local 
land records where the property securing the mortgage loan was located.  In 
the 1990s, industry players including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the 
Mortgage Bankers Association sought to streamline the process of 
assigning mortgages from the originator to the mortgage-note pool.55  They 
attempted to accomplish this purpose by forming The Mortgage Electronic 
Recording System (MERS), which was up and running by the late 1990s.56  
The stated purpose of MERS is to reduce the cost and administrative 
inconvenience of recording mortgage assignments.57  Members of MERS 
attempt to accomplish this purpose by naming MERS as nominee of the 
originator, then trading and recording assignments internally without 
needing to record each assignment in the local land records.58  A MERS 
mortgage contains a statement that says, in substance, “MERS is a separate 
corporation that is acting solely as nominee for the Lender and Lender’s 
successors and assigns.  MERS is the mortgagee under this Security 
Instrument.”59  MERS is not named on any note endorsement.  This new 
system was designed to save lenders a small but not insignificant amount of 
money in the form of recording fees every time a mortgage was transferred.  
Unfortunately, MERS’s legal status was not clear and it had not been 
ratified by Congress or by state legislatures, save for a few, and the concept 
did not receive proper vetting from all affected constituents.60  Nonetheless, 
nearly all the major mortgage originators and RMBS sponsors participated 
in MERS.  As of 2012, MERS stated that more than “74 million mortgages 
have been recorded in the name of MERS Inc., of which 27 million are 
currently active.”61 
 
 55.  Patrick C. Sargent & Mark W. Harris, The Myths and Merits of MERS (Sept. 25, 
2012), ANDREWS KURTH LLP, n.1 http://www.andrewskurth.com/pressroom-publications-
926.pdf (identifying the parties responsible for changing the mortgage assigning process). 
 56.  Id., at 1 (detailing how the MERS-sanctioned account was created). 
 57.  Id. (explaining the reasons for creating MERS). 
 58.  See id. (describing how the MERS system does not usurp the function of local 
recording officials to track changes in ownership of real property). 
 59.  See, e.g., Freddie Mac, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Authorized 
Changes for MERS 1 (2012), available at 
www.freddiemac.com/uniform/doc/unifmersauth.doc (last visited August 1, 2013). 
 60.  Minnesota enacted a “MERS Statute” that allowed nominees like MERS to record 
an “assignment, satisfaction, release, or power of attorney to foreclose.” Minn. Stat. § 
507.413 (2013). 
 61.  Sargent & Harris, supra note 55, at 10. 
BORDEN AND REISS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/14  10:03 AM 
678 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16:3 
 
A MERS-facilitated securitization originally occurred as follows: 
first, a person borrowed from a loan originator, executed a note to the 
originator, and granted the originator a mortgage in the property securing 
the loan.  Second, the originator recorded the mortgage in the local 
recording office, naming MERS as nominee.  Third, the originator assigned 
its rights in the mortgage note and mortgage and transferred them to an 
RMBS sponsor, and MERS recorded the assignment.  Fourth, the sponsor 
assigned the mortgage note and mortgage and transferred them to the 
RMBS trustee, and MERS recorded the assignment.  Fifth, MERS updated 
its database to reflect the transfer of the mortgage to the sponsor and 
RMBS trustee.  Figure 4 illustrates the MERS-facilitated securitization 
process as originally conceived and executed.  The industry used this 
process from the mid-1990s until the early 2000s.62  
 
 
 
During this period, RMBS sponsors became more sophisticated 
and providers diversified the types of loans they offered, so RMBS 
sponsors expanded the types of RMBS that they offered.  Such specialized 
mortgage-note pools included adjusted-rate-mortgage (ARM) loans with 
 
 62.  See MERS Today, MERSCORP HOLDINGS (2012), 
http://www.mersinc.org/component/docman/doc_download/2-mhi-mers-today?Itemid= (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2013) (diagramming the MERS process). 
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teaser rates, cash-out home equity loans, and various subprime products.63  
One type of RMBS pool that emerged was a second-lien RMBS.  A 
second-lien RMBS trust typically held second-lien mortgage loans. In the 
case of default foreclosure, second-lien holders receive payment on their 
loans only after the first-lien is satisfied.64  These new products appeared to 
accelerate the demand for RMBS.  As that demand increased in the early 
2000s, loan originators and RMBS sponsors began cutting corners at every 
level of the securitization process in order to meet investor demand.65  
Those actions flooded RMBS trusts with mortgage notes that would not 
allow the trusts to properly account for interest income inflow-outflow 
mismatch.  This jeopardized the REMIC classification of an untold, but 
significant, percentage of all RMBS trusts. 
Litigation decisions and documents detail the lax practices.  
Somewhat counter-intuitively, downstream litigation (litigation between 
borrowers and banks) is a primary source of information on lax 
securitization practices.  Upstream litigation (litigation between RMBS 
investors and banks) is a primary source of information on unsavory 
lending and loan-origination practices.  The discussion of claims in this 
Article assumes that the plaintiffs can support their claims in many of the 
cases now being litigated.  Given that these claims are consistent with the 
findings of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, the analysis in this 
Article relies on the particulars in some of the cases to paint a picture of 
what a typical REMIC might look like.66  Perhaps some RMBS trusts were 
not as bad as the Article describes, but bad actions appear to have been 
rampant and the portrait painted below likely describes many RMBS trusts.  
The discussion also relies upon a select few filed complaints, but they are 
consistent with dozens of other cases.67  Other studies and reports provide a 
similar picture of the state of affairs in the RMBS and mortgage lending 
industry leading up to the financial crisis.68 
 
 63.  See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3, at 102 (describing the “factory 
line” aspects of the securitization process). 
 64. What Is a Second Mortgage Loan or Junior Lien?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU 
(June 12, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/105/what-is-a-second-mortgage-
loan-or-junior-lien.html (last visited August 1, 2013). 
65.   See infra Part I.C.  
 66.  See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3 (providing examples of 
the consequences of negligent securitization procedures and reckless lending practices). 
 67.  See, e.g., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. UBS Americas, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 5201, at 2 n. 
1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2012), available at 
http://www.buckleysandler.com/uploads/104/doc/opinion-order-fhfa-v-ubs-americas-sdny-
4-may-12.pdf (citing fifteen cases brought by the Federal Housing Finance Agency against 
numerous defendants with similar allegations); REFINBLOG, http://refinblog.com (analyzing 
hundreds of downstream and upstream cases). 
 68.  See, e.g., John M. Griffin, and Gonzalo Maturana, Who Facilitated Misreporting in 
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C. Deterioration of the Securitization Process (Downstream Litigation) 
Corner-cutting in the lending and securitization process led to the 
financial crisis.  In re Kemp, a frequently cited decision from the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court, displays the failed securitization practices that preceded 
the financial crisis.69  On May 31, 2006, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 
(Countrywide) lent $167,000 to John Kemp,70 and Mr. Kemp signed a note 
naming Countrywide as the lender. No endorsement by Countrywide 
appeared on the note.71  An unsigned allonge bearing the same date 
accompanied the note and directed Mr. Kemp to “Pay to the Order of 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., d/b/a America’s Wholesale Lender.”72  On 
the same day, Mr. Kemp signed a mortgage in the amount of $167,000, 
which listed the lender as America’s Wholesale Lender, named MERS as 
the mortgagee, and authorized it to act solely as nominee for the lender and 
the lender’s successors and assigns.73  The mortgage referenced the note 
Mr. Kemp signed and was recorded in the local county clerk’s office on 
July 13, 2006 (a month and a half after Mr. Kemp signed it).74 
On June 28, 2006, Countrywide, as seller, entered into a PSA with 
CWABS, Inc., as depositor (i.e., sponsor); Countrywide Home Loans 
Servicing LP as master servicer; and Bank of New York (BNY) as 
trustee.75  The PSA provided that Countrywide sold, transferred, or 
assigned to the depositor “all the right, title and interest of [Countrywide] 
in and to the Initial Mortgage Loans, including all interest and principal 
received and receivable by [Countrywide].”76  The PSA also provided that 
CWABS would then transfer the Initial Mortgage Loans, which included 
Mr. Kemp’s loan, to the trustee in exchange for certificates referred to as 
Asset-backed Certificates, Series 2006-8 (the RMBS).77  Presumably, the 
depositor then sold the RMBS to investors. 
 
Securitized Loans? (Working Paper, April 30, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract+2256060 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2256060 (describing role 
of misrepresentation by MBS underwriters and loan originators in the events leading to the 
financial crisis). 
 69.  In re Kemp, 440 B.R. 624 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (holding that the bank was not the 
holder and thus not entitled to enforce the debtor’s promissory note). 
 70.  Id. at 627. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. An allonge is “[a] slip of paper sometimes attached to a negotiable instrument 
for the purpose of receiving further indorsements when the original paper is filled with 
indorsements.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 83 (8th ed. 2004). 
 73.  Kemp, 440 B.R. at 627. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. Park Monaco, Inc., and Park Sienna, LLC, also entered into the PSA as sellers.   
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
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The PSA also provided that Countrywide, as depositor, would 
deliver “the original Mortgage Note, endorsed by manual or facsimile 
signature in blank in the following form: ‘Pay to the order of ________ 
without recourse’, with all intervening endorsements from the originator to 
the Person endorsing the Mortgage Note.”78  Although Mr. Kemp’s note 
was supposedly subject to the PSA, Countrywide never endorsed it in blank 
or delivered it to the depositor or trustee as required by the PSA.79  On the 
date of the purported transfer, no one recorded a transfer of the note or the 
mortgage with the county clerk.80  The PSA purported to assign Mr. 
Kemp’s mortgage “[t]ogether with the Bond, Note or other obligation 
described in the Mortgage, and the money due and to become due thereon, 
with interest.”81  That assignment was recorded on March 24, 2008 (almost 
two years after the purported assignment of the mortgage).82 
On March 14, 2007, MERS assigned Mr. Kemp’s mortgage to 
BNY as trustee for the Certificate Holders CWABS, Inc. Asset-backed 
Certificates, Series 2006-8.83  On May 9, 2008, Mr. Kemp filed voluntarily 
for bankruptcy.84  On June 11, 2008, Countrywide, as servicer for BNY, 
filed a secured proof of claim noting Mr. Kemp’s property as collateral for 
the claim.85  In response, Mr. Kemp filed an adversary complaint on 
October 16, 2008 against Countrywide, seeking to expunge its proof of 
claim.86  On September 9, 2009, Countrywide claimed to have possession 
of the mortgage note.87 
At trial in late 2009, Countrywide produced a new undated Allonge 
to Promissory Note, which directed Mr. Kemp to “Pay to the Order of Bank 
of New York, as Trustee for the Certificate-holders CWABS, Inc., Asset-
backed Certificates, Series 6006-8.”88  A supervisor and operational team 
leader for the apparent successor entity of Countrywide Home Loans 
Servicing LP (the master servicer in the PSA) testified that the new allonge 
was prepared in anticipation of the litigation and was signed weeks before 
the trial.89  That same person testified that Mr. Kemp’s original note never 
 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 627–28. 
 81.  Id. at 627. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 626. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 628. 
 88.  Id. The allonge misidentified the asset-backed certificates as 6006-8 instead of 
2006-8.  See id. at n.5. 
 89.  Id. at 628. The record leaves some doubt about whether the supervisor worked for 
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left the possession of Countrywide, but instead went to its foreclosure 
unit.90  She also testified that the new allonge had not been attached to Mr. 
Kemp’s note and that customarily, Countrywide maintained possession of 
the notes and related loan documents.91 
In a later submission, Countrywide represented that it had the 
original note with the new allonge attached, but it provided no additional 
information regarding the chain of title of the note.92  It also produced a 
Lost Note Certificate dated February 1, 2007, providing that Mr. Kemp’s 
original note had been “misplaced, lost or destroyed, and after a thorough 
and diligent search, no one [had] been able to locate the original Note.”93
 The court therefore concluded that at the time of the filing of the proof of 
claim, Mr. Kemp’s mortgage had been assigned to BNY, but Countrywide 
had not transferred possession of the associated note to BNY.94  Figure 5 
summarizes the relevant Kemp facts, illustrating the failure to timely 
transfer and record purported assignments of mortgage notes and 
mortgages. 
 
 
 
the successor of Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP or Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 
See id. at 626 n.3, 628 n.6 (providing a short description of the aftermath of Bank of 
America taking over Countrywide’s entities). 
 90.  Id. at 628. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 628–29. 
 93.  Id. at 628 n.7. 
 94.  Id. at 629 (explaining court’s decision to not recognize bank’s enforcement of note 
because bank did not possess note). 
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The same types of problems arise in upstream litigation because 
the failure to transfer mortgage notes and mortgages to the trusts negatively 
affects the value of RMBS, violates representations in RMBS offering 
materials, and disregards provisions of PSAs.95  Studies presented in 
upstream litigation materials illustrate how rampant cases like Kemp had 
become.  A study of almost a thousand mortgages that were supposed to be 
held by three RMBS trusts formed in 2005, 2006, and 2007, respectively, 
found that none of the mortgages had been assigned to the trusts on the date 
the RMBS sponsor issued the RMBS.96 Within three months after the 
issuances of the RMBS, less than 1% of the mortgages had been assigned 
to the trusts, and more than half of the mortgages were never assigned to 
the trusts.97  The study also found that the parties routinely failed to transfer 
the mortgage notes to the RMBS trusts.  A sample of 442 mortgage notes 
found that only seven, or 1.6% of the total notes, were transferred to the 
trusts within three months after the issuance of the RMBS.98 Investigations 
also revealed that of the mortgages that the parties did eventually assign to 
the RMBS trusts, several were assigned to the wrong trust.99  Other RMBS 
trustees apparently disregarded and failed to disclose audit information that 
confirmed that the RMBS trust did not have possession of the notes.100 
Despite representations in the offering materials and provisions in 
the PSAs to the contrary, many RMBS trusts did not hold mortgage notes 
and mortgages they purported to hold on the issuance date. Even though the 
trusts eventually acquired a small percentage of the mortgage notes and 
mortgages, those acquisitions occurred several months after the formation 
of the RMBS trusts.  The RMBS sponsors were responsible for transferring 
the mortgage notes and mortgages,101 but they knew that the RMBS trusts 
did not have the mortgage notes or mortgages at the time the RMBS trust 
was formed.  The robo-signing scandal that occurred in the wake of the 
financial crisis was rooted in part in an effort to remedy the problems that 
 
 95.  See, e.g., Consolidated Complaint at 13–14, 19–20, HSH Nordbank AG v. Barclays 
Bank PLC, No. 652678/2011 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Apr. 2, 2012) (discussing risks to 
investors from failure to assign mortgage notes to trusts); Knights of Columbus Amended 
Complaint, supra note 46, at 11-17(describing the provisions of the PSAs). 
 96.  See Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 95, at 15–16 (discussing 
investigation into mortgages that were represented to have been deposited in trusts). 
 97.  See id. at 16. 
 98.  See id. at 18. 
 99.  See id. at 17 (analyzing the assignments of sampled mortgages). 
 100.  See Knights of Columbus Amended Complaint, supra note 46, at 21–22 
(describing allegedly misleading practices by RMBS trustees concerning securities filings). 
 101.  See, e.g., Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 95, at 19 (discussing 
alleged failure of mortgage issuers to assign mortgages and notes into trusts). 
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arise when notes are not properly transferred.102  This scandal is further 
evidence that the securitization process in the years preceding the financial 
crisis failed.  Figure 6 depicts the securitization process described in Kemp, 
which was prevalent in the years leading up to the financial crisis. 
 
 
 
The discussion below illustrates how failure of the securitization 
process jeopardizes the REMIC status of numerous RMBS trusts.103 
D. Deterioration of Lending Underwriting Practices (Upstream 
Litigation) 
The discussion of the securitization process reveals that RMBS 
sponsors did not transfer mortgage notes and mortgages to the RMBS 
trusts. Even if the sponsors had transferred the mortgage notes and 
mortgages, the quality of the loans represented by the notes and mortgages 
was so poor that they would not satisfy REMIC requirements.  The 
following discussion illustrates that RMBS sponsors failed to adequately 
 
 102.  The “robo-signing scandal” refers to the widespread practice by lenders of forging 
signatures and engaging in other inappropriate behavior in foreclosure cases.  Alan Zibel et 
al., U.S., Banks Near ‘Robo-Signing’ Settlement, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203735304577169014293051278.html. 
 103.  See infra Part II.A (describing the ownership requirement for REMIC). 
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perform due diligence or act on information from the due diligence they did 
perform, and lenders abandoned responsible mortgage underwriting 
practices.  As a result of the failed due diligence and underwriting 
functions, loans made to unqualified borrowers for homes with undesirable 
occupancy rates entered into RMBS trusts.  Poor appraisal practices also 
left loans under-collateralized.  As a result of these problems, many loans 
were delinquent (or soon to be delinquent) when they entered the RMBS 
trusts. 
1. Failure of Mortgage Underwriting and Due Diligence 
A critical part of RMBS securitization is mortgage underwriting.  
Loan originators underwrite loans they make to borrowers.  Underwriting 
in this context is the process of assessing the potential risk and profitability 
of making a loan to a particular borrower.104  Traditional home mortgage 
underwriting included three elements: (1) collateral, (2) borrower 
creditworthiness (i.e., willingness to pay), and (3) the borrower’s capacity 
to pay (e.g., income).105  Originators abandoned those traditional 
underwriting guidelines and, often with the knowledge of RMBS sponsors, 
transferred low-quality mortgage notes and mortgages to RMBS trusts.  
Originators found that the riskier loan products were the most profitable, so 
they pressed sales agents to push those products, which included option 
ARM, home equity, and subprime loans; originators even structured sales-
agent compensation to encourage such efforts.106 
As a result of the failed underwriting function, lending practices in 
the mid-2000s became abysmal.  Originators failed to verify borrowers’ 
employment or income, made loans to borrowers whom they knew could 
not repay the loans or even make required payments, and reduced the time 
that had to pass since a borrower’s prior bankruptcy.107  Originators also 
 
 104.  See WILLIAM B. BRUEGGEMAN & JEFFREY D. FISHER, REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND 
INVESTMENTS 213 (13th ed. 2008); DAVID C. LING & WAYNE R. ARCHER, REAL ESTATE 
PRINCIPLES: A VALUE APPROACH 304 (2d ed. 2008) (explaining basic traditional home 
mortgage underwriting, with a focus on various risk factors). 
 105.  See LING & ARCHER, supra note 104, at 304 (elaborating on the impact of 
collateral, creditworthiness, and capacity to pay as it applies to mortgage underwriting 
decisions). 
 106.  See, e.g., Amended Complaint, Fed. Housing Fin. Agency v. JPMorgan Chase & 
Co., No. 11 Civ. 6188, at 86-87 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2012) (on file with authors); Vikas 
Bajaj, Subprime Mortgage Lending: A Cross-Country Blame Game, N.Y. TIMES, (May 8, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/08/business/worldbusiness/08iht-
subprime.4.5623442.html (discussing the lending practices of mortgage companies). 
 107.  See JPMorgan Amended Complaint, supra note 106, at 93, 172–187; Bajaj, supra 
note 106. 
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forged proof of loan applicants’ employment and rent-paying history.108  
One originator developed a process called the High Speed Swim Lane 
(HSSL or Hustle) model for loan origination, complete with the motto, 
“Loans Forward, Never Backward.”109  As part of Hustle, the origination 
eliminated toll gates that slowed the originator process, including processes 
necessary for originating investment-quality loans and for preventing 
fraud.110  Hustle even eliminated the underwriting function from all but the 
riskiest loans.111  Originators also steered borrowers to high-risk products 
and granted loans without establishing credit scores.112  Using this process, 
originators made loans to nearly all applicants, even though many clearly 
did not qualify.113  RMBS sponsors were aware that originators had 
abandoned their underwriting guidelines.114 
RMBS sponsors also let their due diligence practices slip well 
below the standards they represented in offering materials.  For example, 
sponsors instructed due diligence vendors not to verify occupancy status or 
credit scores.115  Sponsors knew that they had to accept bad loans to 
preserve business relationships with loan originators, so they disregarded 
 
 108.  See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service, Examples of Mortgage and Real Estate Fraud 
Investigations - Fiscal Year 2013, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Examples-of-Mortgage-and-Real-
Estate-Fraud-Investigations-Fiscal-Year-2013 (listing successful prosecutions involving 
misrepresentations in loan applications of employment, rent payment and other material 
terms); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3, at 12 (noting Minnesota Attorney 
General’s office found “file after file where the [Ameriquest] borrowers were described as 
‘antiques dealers’”). 
 109.  See Complaint-in-Intervention at 16, United States v. Bank of America Corp., No. 
12 Civ. 1422 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/October12/BankofAmericanSuit/BofA%20C
omplaint.pdf (describing techniques allegedly used to eliminate quality control processes). 
 110.  See id. (discussing the way in which Hustle allegedly eliminated mechanisms in 
place for preventing fraud). 
 111.  See id. (alleging that Hustle encouraged risky loans). 
 112.  See, e.g., Dexia v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 2d 231, 239-40 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing loans that originator issued despite obvious problems with 
borrowers’ qualifications); Press Release, Justice Department Reaches $335 Million 
Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Countrywide Financial 
Corporation (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-ag-
1694.html (describing Countrywide’s alleged discriminatory lending practices). 
 113.  See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3, at xxii (describing 
Countrywide lending practices); BoA Complaint-in-Intervention, supra note 109, at 16 
(describing Countrywide lending practices). 
 114.  See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3, at xxii (describing lending 
practices of major financial institutions during the events preceding the financial crisis); 
JPMorgan Amended Complaint, supra note 106, at 197–232. 
 115.  See Dexia 929 F. Supp. 2d at 240 (alleging that sponsors of mortgage backed 
securities engaged in fraudulent practices). 
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due diligence standards and accepted poor-quality loans.116  They also 
abandoned basic due diligence tasks, such as determining the 
reasonableness of income in a stated-income loan.117  Sponsors would 
uncover problematic loans, but they would still accept them into RMBS 
trusts.  One study shows that up to 65% of the loans accepted into 
securitizations violated underwriting guidelines, but RMBS sponsors 
knowingly included them.118  The poor quality of these loans did not satisfy 
REMIC requirements.119 
2. Failed Appraisal Function 
Pressure to produce loans also caused the appraisal function to fail.  
The failure of the appraisal function resulted in misstated loan-to-value 
(LTV) ratios of securitized loans.  The LTV ratio is one of the most 
important measures of the riskiness of a loan. Loans with high LTV ratios 
are more likely to default because the property owners have less interest in 
a property with a high LTV ratio.120  For example, if a loan is 90% of a 
$150,000 property, the property owner’s interest in the property is only 
$15,000 ($150,000 x 10%), giving the property owner 10% equity.  But if 
the LTV ratio is 60%, the property owner’s interest is $60,000 ($150,000 x 
40%).  Thus, the property owner with an LTV ratio of 60% would lose 
more than a property owner with an LTV ratio of 90% if the owner of the 
mortgage foreclosed.  An RMBS trust is also much less likely to recover 
the amount of a loan in a foreclosure sale if a borrower with a high LTV 
ratio defaults on a loan.121 
An important aspect of the LTV ratio is the appraised value of the 
property securing the loan.  To help ensure that the appraised value was 
high enough to meet the representations in the RMBS offering materials 
before the financial crisis, sponsors pressured originators and originators 
 
 116.  See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3, at 109-11; J. P. Morgan 
Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 18 (arguing that due diligence providers approved bad 
loans in order to maintain relationships with originators); Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP v. 
Credit Suisse Group AG, No. 653665/2011, at 35–47 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County Dec. 29, 
2011). 
 117.  See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3, at 109-11 (discussing 
mortgage underwriting standards during financial crisis); J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, 
supra note 7, at 19 (describing the due diligence practices of Clayton Holdings with regards 
to residential mortgage backed securities). 
 118.  J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 19. 
 119.  See infra Part II.B (describing requirements necessary to attain REMIC 
classification). 
 120.  See generally Min Qi & Xiaolong Yang, Loss Given Default of High Loan-to-
Value Residential Mortgages, 33 J. BANKING & FIN.788, 799 (2009). 
 121.  See id. (discussing the characteristics of high loan-to-value residential mortgages). 
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pressured appraisers to ensure that appraised values met the sponsors’ 
requirements.122  In fact, a 2007 study reported that 90% of appraisers had 
been pressured to raise property valuations.123  Originators blacklisted 
appraisers who refused to inflate collateral values, and sponsors instructed 
due diligence vendors not to review appraisals.124 As a result of these 
measures, appraisers increased stated appraisal values of collateral 80% of 
the time when originators requested reconsideration.125 
The failed appraisal function caused the LTV ratio of numerous 
loans to be much higher than sponsors represented.  Widespread and 
systematic overvaluations by mortgage originators created a snowball 
effect that inflated appraised housing prices across the country.126  To 
illustrate, an appraiser might overvalue a home by 10% based upon 
comparable sales and a few months later overvalue a similar home by an 
additional 10% based on the recent appraisal.127 Through this cumulative 
process, appraisals significantly contributed to a run-up in property 
values.128  For example, the LTV ratio of a $100,000 loan would be about 
90% of the property’s value, were the value $111,000.  If the appraiser 
overstated the value by 10%, so the property’s value appeared to be 
$122,000, the LTV ratio for the $100,000 loan would appear to be about 
82%, instead of 90%.  An additional 10% overstatement on a similar home 
 
 122.  See, e.g., Stichting Complaint, supra note 116, at 77. See also Peter S. Goodman & 
Gretchen Morgenson, Saying Yes, WaMu Built Empire on Shaky Loans, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 
27, 2008, at A1 (describing the practice of originators and appraisers in the early 2000s); 
Michael Moss & Geraldine Fabrikant, Once Trusted Mortgage Pioneers, Now Scrutinized, 
N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2008, at A1 (discussing the lending practices of prominent financial 
institutions). 
 123.  See Stichting Complaint, supra note 116, at 77–78; see also Press Release, A.G. 
Schneiderman Secures $7.8 Million Settlement With First American Corporation And 
Eappraiseit For Role In Housing Market Meltdown (Sept. 28, 2012), 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-secures-78-million-settlement-first-
american-corporation-and. 
 124.  See, e.g., Dexia, 929 F. Supp. 2d 231; FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3, 
at 18, 91-92 (discussing practices by appraisers during the events preceding the financial 
crisis); Vikas Bajaj, In Deal with Cuomo, Mortgage Giants Accept Appraisal Standards, N. 
Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/business/04loans.html 
(describing the pressure faced by appraisers to value homes that match or exceed loan 
amounts). 
 125.  See id. 
 126.  See, e.g., Stichting Complaint, supra note 116, at 78 (citing the testimony of 
Richard Bitner, a former executive of a subprime mortgage originator); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY 
COMM’N, supra note 3, at 18, 91-92 (reviewing trends in housing prices as a result of 
mortgage originator practices). 
 127.  See Stichting Complaint, supra note 116, at 78 (citing the testimony of Richard 
Bitner, a former executive of a subprime mortgage originator). 
 128.  See, e.g., id.; FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3, at 18, 91-92. 
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would give it an appraised value of $134,000.  A $100,000 loan on such 
property would have a 75% LTV ratio.  The cumulative process of poor 
appraisal practices thus had a significant effect on LTV ratios. 
Other practices, such as the use of piggy-back loans (i.e., second or 
third loans issued on the acquisition of a property to help ensure that the 
LTV ratio of the first mortgage does not exceed 80% of the value of the 
collateral) also affected the LTV ratios.  A loan with an LTV ratio of less 
than 80% has a low LTV ratio and is a desirable loan, but a loan is 
underwater if it has an LTV ratio greater than 100% (i.e., the loan exceeds 
the value of the property).129  RMBS sponsors routinely overstated the 
percentage of loans that they securitized with low LTV ratios and 
understated the percentage of loans that were underwater.130  In fact, studies 
of loans in numerous RMBS trusts found that the RMBS sponsors routinely 
represented that the pools had no underwater loans.131  Samples of the loans 
in those pools showed percentages of underwater loans in several pools 
exceeding 10% and some exceeding 30%.132  Not surprisingly, RMBS 
sponsors appeared to be aware of the inflated appraisals and the effect they 
had on LTV ratios.133  Nonetheless, they populated RMBS trusts with 
under-secured loans.134  Those actions undermined REMIC classification.135 
3. Failure to Screen and Cure Delinquent Loans 
RMBS sponsors knew that the delinquency and default rates of 
securitized loans were much higher than they represented or that the loans 
would become delinquent shortly after securitization.136  For example, 
 
 129.  See, e.g., Stichting Complaint, supra note 116, at 81; FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, 
supra note 3, at 404. 
 130.  See Stichting Complaint, supra note 116, at 81–82 (presenting data that shows one 
RMBS promoter overstated the percentage of loans with low LTV ratios by as much as 42% 
and understated loans that were underwater by as much as 40%); JPMorgan Amended 
Complaint, supra note 106, at 138–142 (presenting data that shows RMBS promoters 
routinely overstated the loans with low LTV ratios and understated the percentage of 
underwater loans). 
 131.  See JPMorgan Amended Complaint, supra note 106, at 138–142; Stichting 
Complaint, supra note 116, at 28-29. 
 132.  See JPMorgan Amended Complaint, supra note 106, at 138–142; Nordbank 
Consolidated Complaint, supra note 96, at 28-29. 
 133.  See, e.g., Stichting Complaint, supra note 116, at 79–82. 
 134.  See, e.g., Dexia v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 2d 231, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) 
 135.  See infra Part III.B (describing the requirements for an RMBS to qualify to be a 
REMIC). 
 136.  See, e.g., Dexia, 929 F. Supp. 2d at 239-240 (describing loans that an originator 
issued despite obvious problems with the borrowers’ qualifications); J. P. Morgan Securities 
Complaint, supra note 7, at 25–26 (describing defendant’s alleged failure to remove loans 
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RMBS sponsors transferred loans to trusts prior to the expiration of the 
early payment-default period (the thirty to ninety-day period following the 
purchase of a loan during which the sponsor could force the originator to 
repurchase a delinquent or default loan).137  Transferring loans to trusts 
before the expiration of the early payment-default period greatly increases 
the likelihood that the loans will go into default while in the RMBS trust.138  
Sponsors also knew that loans from certain originators had high 
delinquency rates, but they continued to purchase loans from those 
originators and securitize them.139  In fact, sponsors recognized that a 
significant portion of the loans that they securitized were thirty or more 
days delinquent, but they continued to transfer them to trusts and sell 
securities in the trusts.140 
Despite high delinquency rates,141 RMBS sponsors did not enforce 
the repurchase provisions of the PSAs.142  Instead, sponsors and originators 
colluded to skirt repurchase provisions for their own gain at the expense of 
the RMBS investors.  RMBS sponsors supposedly adopted quality control 
measures to determine whether the loans maintained their quality after 
being transferred to the trust.143  If a loan was in default prior to the end of 
the early payment-default period, it would be defective, and would be 
covered by the PSA’s repurchase provision.144  Instead of enforcing the 
repurchase provision and removing defective loans from the RMBS trust, 
however, sponsors entered into confidential settlements with originators at 
a fraction of the loan’s original price.145  Sponsors then pocketed the 
settlement payments and left the defective loan in the RMBS trust.146  This 
behavior not only deprived RMBS investors of assets that were rightfully 
theirs; it also demonstrated that RMBS sponsors were well aware that the 
loans they securitized were below the quality level represented in their 
 
from securitization that it had identified as defective). 
 137.  See Amended Complaint at 23, Dexia SA/NV v. Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., No. 
650180/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 18, 2012). 
 138.  See id. at 23–24 (describing Bear Stearns’ undisclosed policy to securitize loans 
before expiration of the early payment-default period). 
 139.  See J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 11 (claiming that the 
sponsor knew that almost 60% of an originator’s loans were thirty or more days delinquent, 
but continued to purchase loans from that originator). 
 140.  See id. (referring to securitization as a “SACK OF SHIT” and “shit breather” 
because the loans the sponsor was securitizing were believed to be of terrible quality). 
 141.  See, e.g., Dexia, 929 F. Supp. 2d at 231 (describing originator’s actual knowledge 
of high delinquency rates on borrowers’ loans). 
 142.  See J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 25–28. 
 143.  See KRAVITT, supra note 53, § 16.04. 
 144.  See id. 
 145.  See, e.g., J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 25–28. 
 146.  See id. 
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offering materials.  These practices could have denied RMBS trusts 
REMIC classification.147 
E. Realistic Hypothetical RMBS Trust 
As the financial crisis approached, the state of the RMBS industry 
grew bleaker, and an increasing number of RMBS products failed to meet 
clear legal standards.  Until courts decide cases with respect to specific 
RMBS trusts and facts are published, the general public cannot know the 
specific bad acts in which RMBS organizers engaged.  Nonetheless, 
information in the news media, academic studies, court filings and 
government reports provides the basis for constructing a realistic 
hypothetical RMBS trust.  Many, perhaps the vast majority, of RMBS 
trusts created in the years leading up to the financial crisis appear to have 
had significant defects.148  The realistic hypothetical trust provides an 
opportunity to apply the REMIC requirements to an RMBS trust created 
prior to the financial crisis.  The analysis reveals the almost certain 
impossibility that such a trust could be a REMIC.  It also provides a 
blueprint that the IRS (or private parties in qui tam or whistleblower cases) 
can follow to challenge REMIC classification.  A similar analysis would 
apply to other RMBS trusts that may not be as defective as this 
hypothetical RMBS trust. 
 
Characteristics of Realistic Hypothetical Second-Lien RMBS Trust 
• The sponsor issued RMBS in the hypothetical trust in 
early 2007. 
• The sponsor did not transfer any of the mortgage notes or 
assign any of the mortgages to the RMBS trust within 
three months after the date it issued the RMBS securities 
to investors. 
• The mortgages in the RMBS were recorded in MERS’s 
name as nominee for the originators, but there is no 
public record of the assignment of the mortgages to the 
RMBS trust. 
 
 147.  See infra Part III.B. (describing the qualified mortgage requirement for REMIC 
classification). 
148.   Undoubtedly, some trusts would not suffer from all of the ills that afflict our 
hypothetical trust.  Nonetheless, no serious observer would dispute the almost certain 
possibility that trusts like the realistic hypothetical trust were formed and continue to exist. 
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• An affiliate of the originator serviced the mortgage 
notes. 
• The RMBS trust consists only of second-lien loans. 
• The loans that the RMBS trust purportedly owns have 
the following composition: 
o The originator did not obtain verification of the 
borrowers’ employment for 75% of the loans; 
o The LTV ratio for of 75% of the loans exceeded 
100% on the date of formation; 
o Within the early payment-default period, 66% of 
the loans were in default, but the sponsor made 
no effort to remove the loans from the RMBS 
trust; and 
o The occupancy rate of the collateral was 
significantly lower than the occupancy rate 
represented in the offering materials. 
• The loans that the RMBS trust purportedly owns were 
geographically diverse, with loans from all or many of 
the fifty states. 
• The RMBS sponsor would not require the originator to 
repurchase defective loans and would retain settlement 
proceeds received from the originator for defective loans. 
II. REMIC QUALIFICATION 
With a somewhat clear picture of the RMBS industry in the years 
leading up to the financial crisis, and with a realistic hypothetical trust to 
examine closely, the analysis turns to the tax aspects of REMICs.  Federal 
tax treatment of REMICs is important in two respects.  First, it specially 
classifies REMICs as something other than tax corporations, tax 
partnerships, or trusts and generally exempts REMICs from federal income 
taxation.149  Second, it treats regular interests in REMICs as debt 
instruments.150  These two characteristics provide REMICs and their 
investors with favorable tax treatment.  REMICs must compute taxable 
income, but because the regular interests are treated as debt instruments, 
REMICs deduct from their gross income amounts that constitute interest 
payments to the holders of regular interests.151  Without these rules, a 
 
 149.  I.R.C. § 860A(a)(2006). 
 150.  I.R.C. § 860B(a) (2006); I.R.C. § 860C(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 151.  See I.R.C. § 163(a) (2006) (allowing “as a deduction all interest paid or accrued 
within the taxable year on indebtedness”); I.R.C. § 860C(b)(1)(A) (2006) (treating regular 
interests in REMICs as debt instruments); Van Brunt, supra note 32, at 168: 
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REMIC would most likely be a tax corporation and the regular interests 
could be equity interests.152  If that were the case, the REMIC would not be 
able to deduct payments made to the regular interest holders and, as a 
taxable C corporation, would owe federal income tax on a significant 
amount of taxable income.153  Thus, REMIC classification provides 
significant tax benefits. 
To obtain REMIC classification, an RMBS trust must satisfy 
several requirements.154  Of particular interest in this context is the 
requirement that within three months after the trust’s startup date, 
substantially all of the RMBS trust assets must be qualified mortgages or 
permitted investments (the substantially-all test).155  Mortgage notes would 
not come with the definition of permitted investment, so this article focuses 
on whether an RMBS trust’s assets would be qualified mortgages.156  Thus, 
REMIC classification has four requirements: (1) the ownership requirement 
(the RMBS trust must be the tax owner of qualified mortgages); (2) the 
qualified-mortgage requirement (the assets of the RMBS trust must be 
qualified mortgages); (3) a timing requirement (the RMBS trust must own a 
static pool of qualified mortgages within three months after the RMBS 
startup date); and (4) the substantially-all requirement (the RMBS trust’s 
assets must be almost exclusively qualified mortgages). 
Congress and the Treasury designed the REMIC classification 
rules for arrangements that existed in 1986, when Congress created 
REMICs.157  The rules do not address the wide-scale problems of the 
financial crisis, so many of the issues discussed in the following analysis 
 
 [R]egular interests in the REMIC shall be treated as indebtedness of the 
REMIC.  This is one of the important advances made by the REMIC 
legislation—to remove the vexing debt vs. equity issue.  In this context, the 
principal effect of this statutory pronouncement is to ensure that relevant 
payments to regular interest holders constitute interest and thus are deductible in 
computing REMIC taxable income or net loss. 
 152.  If an arrangement loses REMIC status, it will likely be classified as a taxable 
mortgage pool or a publicly-traded partnership (assuming its interests are publicly traded).  
See KRAVITT, supra note 53, § 16.04. 
 153.  See supra Part I.A. 
 154.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 860D(a) (2006) (defining REMIC); I.R.C. § 860D(b) (2006) 
(requiring the RMBS trust to make an election). 
 155.  I.R.C. § 860D(a)(4) (2006). 
 156.  The principal assets of a mortgage-backed security are mortgages, not the type of 
asset that comes within the definition of a permitted investment.  Thus, the test is whether 
the assets are qualified mortgages.  If mortgage notes fail to come within the definition of 
qualified mortgages, they will most likely not come within the definition of a permitted 
investment. 
 157.  See supra Part I.A. (discussing 1986 Tax Reform Act and REMIC flow-through 
treatment). 
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will be issues of first impression if a court considers them.158  A large body 
of law addresses the question of tax ownership in various contexts, 
including the ownership of obligations,159 but none of that law contemplates 
whether a purported REMIC is the tax owner of mortgage notes.  Beyond 
the guidance in the regulations, no authority appears to address the 
qualified-mortgage requirement, the timing requirement, or the 
substantially-all requirement.  Thus, existing law provides a framework for 
part of the analysis, but much of the analysis is original.  The law of tax 
ownership makes the analysis of the ownership requirement larger (but no 
more important) than the analysis of the other requirements. 
A. Ownership Requirement 
An arrangement comes within the definition of REMIC only if it 
owns qualified mortgages within the required time period (assuming none 
of its assets are permitted investments).160  The federal tax definition of 
ownership governs whether a purported REMIC owns qualified 
mortgages.161  Federal tax law does not defer to the state-law definition of 
ownership, but it does look to state law to determine parties’ rights, 
obligations, and interests in property.162  Tax law can also disregard the 
transfer (or lack of transfer) of formal title where the transferor retains 
many of the benefits and burdens of ownership.163  Courts focus on whether 
the benefits and burdens of ownership pass from one party to another when 
 
 158.  Courts are just beginning to define the relationship between the REMIC rules, 
foreclosure statutes, and the laws governing the transfer of notes. See, e.g., Glaski v. Bank 
of America, No. F064556 (Cal. Ct. App. July 31, 2013) (holding that voiding an attempted 
transfer of note or mortgage was justified when it protected beneficiaries of the trust from 
potential adverse tax consequences of losing status as REMIC trust). 
 159.  See infra Part II. A. (discussing ownership requirement for REMIC classification). 
 160.  See I.R.C. § 860D(a)(4) (2006) (requiring substantially all of a purported REMIC’s 
assets to be qualified mortgages or permitted investments within three months of startup 
date). 
 161.  See Bradley T. Borden & David J. Reiss, Beneficial Ownership and The REMIC 
Classification Rules, 28 TAX MGMT. REAL EST. J. 274 (Nov. 14, 2012) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2175766. 
(discussing importance of tax classification for REMICs and questionable tax classification 
of purported REMIC trusts). 
 162.  See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932) (“The state law creates legal 
interests, but the federal statute determines when and how they shall be taxed. We examine 
[state] law only for the purpose of ascertaining whether the leases conform to the standard 
which the taxing statute prescribes for giving the favored treatment to capital gains.”). 
 163.  See Bailey v. Comm’r, 912 F.2d 44, 47 (2nd Cir. 1990) (discussing cases where the 
courts have disregarded the transfer of formal title when the transferor continues to retain 
many of the benefits and burdens of ownership). 
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considering who is the tax owner of the property.164  “To properly discern 
the true character of [a transaction], it is necessary to ascertain the intention 
of the parties as evidenced by the written agreements, read in light of the 
attending facts and circumstances . . .”165  If, however, the transaction does 
not coincide with the parties’ bona fide intentions, courts ignore the stated 
intentions.166  Thus, the analysis of ownership cannot merely look to the 
agreements the parties entered into, because the label that parties give to a 
transaction does not determine its status.167  Instead, the analysis must 
examine the underlying economics and the attending facts and 
circumstances to determine who owns the mortgage notes for tax 
purposes.168 
 
 164.  Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 1221, 1237 (1981); Sollberger v. 
Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1119, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2012); Calloway v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1315, 
1327 (11th Cir. 2012); Kinsey v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2011-257 (2011).  See also I.R.S. 
Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009, at 13 (Apr. 20, 2001) (stating that “transfer of a 
substantial portion of the benefits and burdens of ownership of property is not characteristic 
of a financing,” but rather constitutes sale of an entity’s ownership interest); I.R.S. Tech. 
Adv. Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998) (stating that “a transaction is a sale if the benefits 
and burdens of ownership have passed to the purported purchaser”).  In Grodt the Tax Court 
listed eight factors that it considered relevant in determining whether a sale occurs for tax 
purposes:  
(1) Whether legal title passes; (2) how the parties treat the transaction; (3) 
whether an equity was acquired in the property; (4) whether the contract creates 
a present obligation on the seller to execute and deliver a deed and a present 
obligation on the purchaser to make payments; (5) whether the right of 
possession is vested in the purchaser; (6) which party pays the property taxes; 
(7) which party bears the risk of loss or damage to the property; and (8) which 
party receives the profits from the operation and sale of the property.  
Grodt, 77 T.C. at 1237–38 (internal citations omitted). 
 165.  Haggard v. Comm’r, 24 T.C. 1124, 1129 (1955), aff’d 241 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1956) 
(holding that petitioners whose payment was excessive in relation to the fair rental value of 
a property, intended to and did acquire an equity in the property). 
 166.  See Union Planters Nat’l Bank of Memphis v. United States, 426 F.2d 115, 117 
(6th Cir. 1970) (“We do not agree that subjective intent is decisive here.”); Farley Realty 
Corp. v. Comm’r, 279 F.2d 701, 705 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding that “the parties’ bona fide 
intentions may be ignored if the relationship the parties have created does not coincide with 
their intentions”). 
 167.  See Helvering v. F.& R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939) (standing for the 
proposition that “formal written documents are not rigidly binding”); Mapco Inc. v. United 
States, 556 F.2d 1107, 1110 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (recognizing that a transaction “was not an 
economically real sale and, therefore, cannot be recognized as a sale for tax purposes”); 
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-191-20 (Dec. 20, 1979) (disregarding a lease agreement to rule 
privately that an arrangement was a sale). 
 168.  See Lazarus, 308 U.S. at 255 (“In the field of taxation, administrators of the laws, 
and the courts, are concerned with substance and realities, and formal written documents are 
not rigidly binding.”); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935) (standing for the 
proposition that courts will not “exalt artifice above reality”); Washington Mut. Inc. v. 
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The analysis of mortgage-note ownership begins with an 
examination of a fundamental indicium of owning an obligation—the right 
to enforce the obligation.169  In re Kemp addressed the issue of 
enforceability of a mortgage note under the Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C.) in the bankruptcy context.170  The court held that a note was 
unenforceable against the maker of the note and the maker’s property under 
the U.C.C. on two grounds.171  First, the court held that the alleged owner 
of the note, BNY, could not enforce the note because it did not have 
possession and because the note lacked proper endorsement.172  
Recognizing that the mortgage note came within the U.C.C. definition of 
negotiable instrument,173 the court considered who was entitled to enforce a 
negotiable instrument under the U.C.C.174  The three types of persons 
entitled to enforce a negotiable instrument are:   
[1] the holder of the instrument, [2] a nonholder in possession of 
the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or [3] a person not 
 
United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 2011) (“As an overarching principle, absent 
specific provision, the tax consequences of any particular transaction must reflect the 
economic reality.”); Lazarus v. Comm’r, 513 F.2d 824, 829 n.9 (9th Cir. 1975) (“‘Technical 
considerations, niceties of the law of trusts or conveyances, or the legal paraphernalia which 
inventive genius may construct’ must not frustrate an examination of the facts in the light of 
economic realities.” (citing Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940)); Union 
Planters, 426 F.2d at 118 (“In cases where the legal characterization of economic facts is 
decisive, the principle is well established that the tax consequences should be determined by 
the economic substance of the transaction, not the labels put on it for property law (or tax 
avoidance) purposes.” (citing Comm’r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 266–67 (1958), 
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)). 
 169.  See JAMES M. PEASLEE & DAVID Z. NIRENBERG, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
SECURITIZATION TRANSACTIONS AND RELATED TOPICS 80 (4th ed. 2011) (“The power to 
control encompasses the right to take any of the actions relating to a debt instrument that 
may be taken by its owner, including enforcing or modifying its terms or disposing of the 
asset.”). 
 170.  See In re Kemp, 440 B.R. 624, 629 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (stating that a claim in 
bankruptcy is disallowed after an objection “to the extent that . . . such claim is 
unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement or 
applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or unmatured.”) 
(citing 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1)).  New Jersey adopted the U.C.C. in 1962.  CLARK E. ALPERT 
ET AL., GUIDE TO NEW JERSEY CONTRACT LAW § 1.3.2 (2011).  This article cites to the 
U.C.C. generally, instead of specifically to the New Jersey U.C.C., to illustrate the general 
applicability of the holding.  Other courts have reached conclusions similar to the 
Bankruptcy Court’s opinion.  See, e.g., Cutler v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 109 So. 3d 224, 
226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that if a bank could not establish that it was the 
holder of the mortgage note or allonge that “took effect prior to the date of the complaint, it 
did not have standing to bring [a foreclosure claim]”). 
 171.  Kemp, 440 B.R. at 629–30. 
 172.  Id. at 629–30. 
 173.  See id. at 630 (citing the definition of “negotiable instrument” in [U.C.C. § 3-104]). 
 174.  Id. 
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in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the 
instrument pursuant to [U.C.C.] Section § 3-309 or 3-418(d).175   
The court then explained why BNY was not a person entitled to enforce the 
mortgage note.  First, the court described why BNY was not the holder of 
Mr. Kemp’s note.  A holder is “the person in possession of a negotiable 
instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is 
the person in possession.”176  A person does not qualify as a holder by 
merely possessing or owning a note.177  Instead, a person becomes a holder 
through “negotiation.”178  The two elements of negotiation are: (1) transfer 
of possession to the transferee and (2) endorsement by the holder.179  The 
court recognized that because BNY never came into physical possession of 
the note, it was not the holder.180  It also recognized that the endorsed 
allonge was not affixed to the original note until the second trial date (the 
first trial date is relevant for determining rights), so BNY also failed to 
satisfy the second element.181  Thus, to have the rights of enforcement as 
holder, a person must be in possession of an endorsed note at the time when 
holder status is important.  Based on this analysis, many RMBS trusts, 
including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, would not be 
considered holders of many of the mortgage notes they claim to own. 
Second, the court described why BNY was not a non-holder in 
possession.182  The U.C.C. provides that “[a] person may be a person 
entitled to enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner 
of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument,”183 which 
would include a person in possession who is not a holder.184  Therefore, a 
person can be a non-holder in possession if the person acquires an 
unendorsed note as a successor to a holder of the note.185  The court 
 
 175.  U.C.C. § 3-301 (2006). 
 176.  U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(21) (2005). 
 177.  See Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev. Inc., 853 F.2d 163, 166 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(explaining what is insufficient to qualify as a note holder, noting that ownership alone is 
not by itself automatically sufficient). 
 178.  See U.C.C. § 3-201(a) (2002). 
 179.  See U.C.C. § 3-201(b) (2002). 
 180.  See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 630 (citing Dolin v. Darnall, 115 N.J.L. 508, 181 A. 201 
(E&A 1935)) (“Since the plaintiff was not ‘in possession of’ the notes in question, he was 
neither the ‘holder’ nor the ‘bearer’ thereof.”). The court also rejected the claim that the 
Bank of New York was in constructive possession of the note because the U.C.C. requires 
actual possession.  See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 631 n.13 (citing N.J.S.A. § 12A:1-201(20)). 
 181.  See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 630-31. 
 182.  See id. at 632 (analyzing the characteristics of a non-holder in possession). 
 183. See id. at 632 (quoting N.J.S.A. § 12A:3-301). 
 184.  U.C.C. § 3-301 Comment (2002). 
 185.  See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 632 (outlining the third category in which a claimant can 
enforce a note, whereby a party can qualify as a non-holder in possession If said party buys 
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recognized that BNY was a successor to a holder and would qualify as a 
non-holder in possession, if it had possession of the note.186  Because BNY 
lacked possession, however, it was not a non-holder in possession.187  Many 
RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, would 
similarly fail to be non-holders in possession of many of the mortgage 
notes they claim to own. 
Finally, the court concluded that BNY did not qualify as a non-
holder not in possession that could enforce the note.188  A non-holder not in 
possession of a note can enforce a note that is lost, destroyed, or stolen.189  
To enforce the note under these rules, however, the person must satisfy 
three requirements.190  First, prior to the loss, the person must have been in 
possession of the note and have been entitled to enforce it when the loss of 
possession occurred.191  Second, the loss of possession cannot have been 
the result of transfer by the person or a lawful seizure.192  Third, the person 
must be unable to reasonably obtain possession because the instrument was 
destroyed, the person cannot determine its whereabouts, or it is in the 
wrongful possession of an unknown person or a person that cannot be 
found or is not amenable to service of process.193  Finding that BNY was 
never in possession of the note, the court held that it was not a non-holder 
not in possession.  Considering common practices of the times, many 
RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, would 
also fail to qualify as non-holders not in possession.194 
 
the note and becomes the successor to the holder of the note, but where in the facts of the 
actual case, the successor did not have possession); U.C.C. § 3-301 Comment (2002). 
 186.  See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 632 (explaining how BNY could qualify as a non-holder in 
possession if it was a successor to the holder). 
 187.  See id. at 632 (explaining why BNY could not enforce the note as a non-holder in 
possession, because although it was the successor as holder of the note, it never actually had 
possession of the relevant notes). 
 188.  See id. at 633 (showing how the UCC permits enforcement of lost, destroyed, or 
stolen instruments). 
 189.  See U.C.C. § 3-309 (2002). 
 190.  See U.C.C. § 3-309(a) (2002) (outlining the requirements for enforcing an 
instrument by a person not in possession of the instrument). 
 191.  See U.C.C. § 3-309(a)(1)(A) (2002) (detailing how the right to enforce the 
instrument when loss of possession occurred can result in instrument enforcement). 
 192.  See U.C.C. § 3-309(2) (2002). 
 193.  See U.C.C. § 3-309(3) (2002). 
 194.  See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 632–33.  Kemp cites Marks v. Braunstein, 439 B.R. 248 
(D.Mass. 2010), which held that a person who was never in possession of the note could not 
enforce it.  The purpose of requiring prior possession in a lost-note claim is to protector a 
borrower from multiple claims, but the Marks court followed a strict interpretation of the 
statute and disallowed the claim of the person who was never in possession of the note, even 
though conflicting enforcement claims were not a concern in the case.  See 439 B.R. at 251 
(citing Premier Capital, LLC v. Gavin, 319 B.R. 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2004)). 
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Another important aspect of the court’s decision in In re Kemp is 
the discussion regarding the difference between ownership of a note and 
the right to enforce the note.  The court recognized that the recorded 
assignment of the mortgage evidenced an attempt to assign the note, and 
the PSA provided for an assignment of the note.195  The court 
acknowledged that those documents “created an ownership issue, but did 
not transfer the right to enforce the note.”196  “The right to enforce an 
instrument and ownership of the instrument are two different concepts.”197  
The U.C.C. acknowledges that a person may transfer all right, title, and 
interest in a note to a transferee, which gives the transferee a claim to 
ownership of the note.198  The transferee is not, however, entitled to enforce 
the note until the transferee obtains possession of it, so transfer of the 
instrument occurs only when the transferor delivers it to the transferee.199  
Thus, the court concluded that BNY had a valid claim to ownership, but did 
not have the right to enforce the note.200  Based upon sworn testimony, 
originators retained possession of mortgage notes as a matter of course.201  
Because many RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS 
trust, did not have possession of the mortgage notes on the startup date, or 
three months thereafter, they could not enforce the notes during that time 
period.  Thus, they lacked an important indicium of ownership at the 
relevant time. 
Courts and the IRS have considered note ownership for tax 
purposes in other contexts, and a number of cases and rulings provide 
additional guidance for considering who owns the notes and mortgages.  
The IRS derived eight factors from the cases that courts consider to 
 
 195.  See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 633. 
 196.  Id.  Indeed, under Article 9 of the U.C.C., which the Kemp court did not consider 
because it focused on enforceability, BNY might have been the owner of the note. See 
generally Elizabeth Renuart, Uneasy Intersection: The Right to Foreclose and the UCC, 48 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2316152 (discussing the intersection of 
Articles 3 and 9 of the U.C.C.). 
 197.  U.C.C. § 3-203 Comment 1 (2002). 
 198.  See id. 
 199.  See id. 
 200.  See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 632–34. (noting that someone may be entitled to enforce an 
instrument even if they are not the owner, and that BNY, although the owner of the note, did 
not have rights to enforce said note, while also finding that that even if Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc., as servicer for the Bank of New York and holder of the note, was the agent of 
the Bank of New York, it would have no greater right than the Bank of New York had.  
Because the Bank of New York had no right to enforce the note, Countrywide Home Loans, 
Inc., would have no right to enforce the note).  This ruling refutes the position that even 
though the REMIC trust does not have possession of a note, it can enforce it through the 
PSA using the servicer as an agent. 
 201.  See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 628-29 (discussing possession of the instrument at issue). 
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determine whether the benefits and burdens of an obligation pass from one 
party to another.202  The respective factors do not have any particular 
weight, and circumstances will determine which factors are the most 
important.203  In fact, “an exclusive list of factors risks over-formalizing the 
concept of ‘sale,’ hamstrings a court’s effort to discern a transaction’s 
substance and realities in evaluating tax consequences.”204  Thus, courts 
may apply a flexible, case-by-case analysis to determine whether benefits 
and burdens have transferred.205  The economics of a transaction may, 
however, dictate that only the risk of loss and potential for gain have real 
significance, and then only to the extent that they are economically 
realistic.206  Thus, the factors aid with the analysis, but they are not 
definitive.  The following discussion illustrates, however, that many of the 
benefits and burdens of owning mortgage notes did not transfer to many 
RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust. 
The first factor for considering who owns a note is whether the 
parties treat the transactions as a sale.207  Courts and the IRS consider many 
different variables when deciding whether parties treat a transaction as a 
sale.  For example, they look at the agreement between the parties.208  In the 
case of purported REMICs that were part of MERS-facilitated 
securitizations, PSAs provided that the originator would transfer mortgage 
notes and the purported REMIC trusts would acquire them.209  PSAs also 
 
 202.  See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (determining 
whether the transaction constituted a sale or a pledge of the pool of subordinated mortgage 
loans, while listing eight factors to consider in making such a determination); I.R.S. Tech. 
Adv Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998) (providing the eight factors involved in an analysis on 
whether or not a sale occurred). 
 203.  See Calloway v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2012) (balancing factors to 
determine transaction was a sale, not a loan); Sollberger v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1119, 1124–
25 (9th Cir. 2012); I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (noting 
factors’ importance are fact-specific and that no one factor is dispositive). 
 204.  See Sollberger, 691 F.3d at 1124 (citing Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 
561, 573 (1978) and Lazarus v. Comm’r, 513 F.2d 824, 829 n.9 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
 205.  See Sollberger, 691 F.3d at 1124 (citing Gray v. Comm’r, 561 F.2d 753, 757 (9th 
Cir. 1977)). 
 206.  See I.R.S. Tech. Adv Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998) (focusing on risk of loss in 
a typical high quality auto loan securitization). 
 207.  See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (outlining factors 
assessed to determine whether obligation passes from one party to another and whether the 
transaction can be treated as a sale). 
 208.  See United Surgical Steel Co. v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 1215, 1220–22, 1230 (1970) 
(examining how the petitioner treated a transaction, and how the obligations to repay the 
bank rested in the petitioner, such that it could be categorized as a loan by the bank to the 
petitioner  and its guarantors as opposed to any other party). 
 209.  See In re Kemp, 440 B.R. 624, 627; Knights of Columbus Amended Complaint, 
supra note 46, at 11–17 (laying out the PSA provisions for purported REMICs in MERS-
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provided that mortgage servicers and REMIC trustees would verify the 
transfer of the mortgage notes and grant the REMICs legal recourse to 
obtain untransferred notes.210   
Agreements, however, may be inconclusive because they may have 
conflicting positions.211  Courts and the IRS will also ignore the agreement 
if its title conflicts with the parties’ intent.212  Instead, they will consider 
whether the purported transferee parted “with any substantial incident of 
ownership . . . of the obligation,”213 and whether the purported transferee 
“retained title to, and possession of, the . . . obligations.”214 
Leading up to the financial crisis, originators commonly retained 
possession of mortgage notes, so in that respect, they did not treat their 
RMBS trust transactions as transfers.215  Sponsors disregarded the 
repurchase provisions of PSAs and, instead of purging RMBS trusts of 
defective loans, agreed to receive settlement proceeds from the 
originators.216  Thus, while PSAs provided for the transfer of possession of 
mortgage notes, sponsors routinely disregarded those provisions.  Sponsors 
did this in the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust as well.  The actions of 
both sponsors and originators before the financial crisis therefore conflicted 
with relevant agreements. 
Courts and the IRS will also look at how parties treat a transaction 
for tax and accounting purposes to determine tax ownership.217  For federal 
income tax and accounting purposes, sponsors and originators appear to 
 
facilitated securitizations). 
 210.  See Knights of Columbus Amended Complaint, supra note 46, at 21–22 
(evidencing such a framework, providing various provisions of a PSA and what rights and 
obligations exist between the parties). 
 211.  See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (finding language 
in a servicing agreement that treated the transaction as a sale and language in the private 
placement memorandum that treated the transaction as a financing arrangement). 
 212.  See Haggard v. Comm’r, 241 F.2d 288, 289 (9th Cir. 1956) (“The intent of the 
parties was perfectly plain. The bare fact that one of the joined documents was drawn in 
lease form and terminology by the parties is of no consequence.”). 
 213.  Town & Country Food Co. v. Comm’r, 51 T.C. 1049, 1057 (1969). 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  See supra Part II.A. 
 216.  See supra Part I.D.3. 
 217.  See Sollberger v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that 
parties stopped reporting interest earned on purported collateral and purported borrower 
stopped making interest payments); United Surgical Steel Co. v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 1215, 
1220–22, 12221-22 (1970) (discussing arrangement between bank and petitioner and 
respective assignment of responsibilities, as well as petitioner’s method of deducting tax 
liability over years in dispute); Yancey Bros. Co. v. United States, 319 F. Supp. 441, 446 
(N.D. Ga. 1970) (recognizing that taxpayer continued to pay intangibles tax due from owner 
of a note held that no transfer occurred); I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 
20, 2001). 
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have treated RMBS trusts as both owners and non-owners.  With no 
information to the contrary, this analysis assumes that those parties 
allocated cash flows from borrowers to the trusts, which the trusts in turn 
paid to RMBS investors.  RMBS trusts also presumably recognized interest 
income from loans and deducted interest paid to RMBS investors.  
Presumably, they also allocated phantom income to the holders of residual 
interests.  In these ways, originators and sponsors treated RMBS trusts as 
tax owners of mortgage notes. 
Nonetheless, the originators and sponsors knew that a significant 
percentage of the loans in RMBS trusts were defective, but they did not 
replace them.218  Instead, they agreed between themselves to settle the 
originators’ repurchase prices and deprive the RMBS investors of their 
right to the funds.219  Thus, originators and sponsors knew that the loans in 
RMBS trusts were worth less than the amount accounted for, but they did 
not adjust their tax accounting accordingly.  In this respect, they treated 
someone other than the RMBS trust as tax owner of the mortgage notes. 
Taxes also include recording fees that parties must pay to record 
the transfer of a mortgage note or mortgage.  Sponsors and originators 
treated the transaction as something other than a sale for state fee recording 
purposes.  Many mortgages recorded by MERS provide that MERS is 
nominee or agent of the mortgagee’s successors or assigns, but sponsors 
and originators often would not record the assignment of a mortgage note 
to the RMBS trust. Apparently, they did this in order to avoid paying 
recording fees and taxes at the time of the purported transfers from the 
originator to the trust.220  Consequently, for state recording fee purposes, 
they treated the originator or MERS as the owner of the mortgage note, but 
not the trust.  Local jurisdictions are now seeking recording fees for 
unrecorded assignments of mortgage notes.221  Failure to record the transfer 
of mortgage notes to RMBS trusts is another way in which originators and 
sponsors treated someone other than the RMBS trusts as tax owner. 
 
 218.  See supra Part I.D.3. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 628 (recording assignment of mortgage twenty-one months 
after the parties executed the PSA and the originator purportedly transferred the note and the 
trust acquired it); Christian Cnty. Clerk v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 515 Fed. 
Appx 451, 453) (dismissing case brought by county clerks in Kentucky seeking recording 
fees from MERS and banks); Montgomery Cnty. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 436 
(E.D. Pa. 2012) (denying MERSCORP’s motion to dismiss counties’ claim for recording 
fees). 
 221.  See, e.g., Christian County Clerk, 515 Fed. Appx. at 453  (dismissing case brought 
by county clerks in Kentucky seeking recording fees from MERS and banks); Montgomery 
County, 904 F. Supp. 2d 436 (denying MERS’s motion to dismiss counties’ claim for 
recording fees). 
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The second factor for considering who owns a note is whether the 
parties notify the obligor of the transfer of obligations.222  Failure to notify 
the obligor of a transfer of an obligation generally indicates that the 
transaction was not a transfer.223  Case law does not expound on this factor, 
but its application appears to be straightforward.  In the case of securitized 
mortgage notes, the obligors are the borrowers.  The originators could 
notify the obligor of a transfer by direct communication or public notice.  
The originator could provide public notice by recording the transfer in 
county records.  Indeed, the purpose of recording transfers of mortgages is 
to put the public (including the obligor) on notice of the transfer in order to 
prevent multiple claims for the same note.224  In fact, legal conflicts often 
arise because obligors are unsure of who holds a mortgage note and who 
has the right to bring foreclosure actions on the corresponding property.  
By failing to record the assignment of mortgages or providing other 
notification, originators and sponsors failed to notify borrowers of a 
transfer of the obligation.  This factor suggests the RMBS trusts, including 
the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, were not the tax owners of the 
mortgage notes. 
The third factor for ownership considers which party serviced the 
obligations.225  Generally, the originator, or an entity affiliated with the 
originator, services an RMBS trust’s mortgage notes.226  The originator’s 
continuing to service an obligation generally indicates that the originator is 
the tax owner of the note.227 
The fourth ownership factor is whether payments made to the 
purported transferee correspond to collections on the debt instrument.228  If 
 
 222.  See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. 
Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998). 
 223.  See United Surgical Steel Co. v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 1215, 1230 (1970) (“As far as 
the customer knew, the [originator] was the person to whom he was indebted.”). 
 224.  See WOLF, supra note 48, § 37.27. 
 225.  See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001); Tech. Adv Mem. 
98-39-001 (May 29, 1998). 
 226.  See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 627 (providing that the PSA named Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc., as originator and Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP (an affiliate of 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.) as servicer). 
 227.  See United Surgical Steel, 54 T.C. at 1229–30 (“The [originator] continued to 
handle all collections and otherwise to service its customers.  In fact, there was no contact 
between the customer and the bank.”); Town & Country Food Co., 51 T.C. at 1057 (“[The 
originator] collected payments as they became due and deposited them in its own bank 
account.”). 
 228.  See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (stating that a 
transaction is classified as a sale if benefits and burdens of ownership are passed to alleged 
purchaser); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998) (stating that one of the 
factors examined in determining whether benefits and burdens of ownership have been 
transferred include whether payments to transferees correspond to collections on notes). 
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payments to transferees correspond to collections on obligations, the 
transaction is more likely to be treated as a transfer.229  But courts have 
stated that corresponding payments are not dispositive.230  PSAs generally 
required the originator (so long as it retained the servicing rights) to collect 
payments from obligors and deliver them to the RMBS trust or the RMBS 
investors net of appropriate fees,231 so if record-keeping was accurate and 
borrowers made scheduled payments on the notes, payments to the 
transferee would generally correspond to collections.  Such payments 
would therefore indicate that RMBS trusts were tax owners. 
PSAs also provide that originators are obligated to repurchase or 
replace defective loans.232  Sponsors, however, would not enforce 
repurchase obligations and would retain settlement payments paid by 
originators to compensate for defective mortgage notes.233  Repurchase 
payments are one type of payment on the loans, and RMBS trusts would 
not receive those payments.  Because payments to RMBS trusts did not 
correspond with the collections by the sponsor of repurchase settlement 
proceeds, such actions would suggest that some RMBS trusts, including the 
hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, were not the tax owners of the 
mortgage notes. 
The fifth ownership factor contemplates whether the transferee 
imposes restrictions on the operations of the transfer that are consistent 
with a lender-borrower relationship.234  Cases holding that transactions 
were loans secured by notes and not transfers of the notes often considered 
restrictions that lenders placed on the borrowers to help secure repayment 
 
 229.  See Branham v. Comm’r, 51 T.C. 175, 180 (1968) (agreeing with IRS’s contention 
that series of installment payments resulting from note that were identical to amount of 
principal and interest due to petitioner, which was subsequently transferred to the 
petitioner’s daughters in exchange for stock in another company, amounted to transfer of 
ownership benefits). 
 230.  See United Surgical Steel, 54 T.C. at 1228 (“[T]here is no basis in law upon which 
to conclude that merely because the amount borrowed is substantially equal to the face 
amount of the collateral, the taxpayer has thereby disposed of the collateral.”). 
 231.  See KRAVITT, supra note 53, § 4.02. 
 232.  See id. at § 16.04. 
 233.  See J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 25–28 (alleging that J. P. 
Morgan’s quality control department failed to eliminate defective loans that entered 
securitization, where in some situations it led to J. P. Morgan seeking and obtaining 
confidential settlements for toxic loans without repurchasing the defective loans as actually 
required). 
 234.  See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (declaring that one 
factor in deciding if a sale occurred includes whether restrictions indicative of a lender-
borrower relationship are imposed by the transferee); Tech. Adv Memo. 98-39-001 (May 
29, 1998) (stating that one factor involved in determining whether a sale occurred is whether 
the transferee creates limitations on the operations of the transferor that express a lender-
borrower type relationship). 
BORDEN AND REISS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/14  10:03 AM 
2014] REMIC TAX ENFORCEMENT 705 
 
of the loan and protect the collateral.235  Such restrictions include keeping 
records in a manner that satisfies a lender, allowing the lender to audit the 
borrower’s books, furnishing periodic financial statements to the lender, 
paying taxes as they become due, keeping the collateral insured, requiring 
approval for other purchases, and restricting both the payment of 
compensation and dividends and the creation of other indebtedness.236  
Distinctive restrictions also include margin account payment requirements 
and requirements to maintain a certain ratio of collateral to debt.237  A 
borrower’s need to satisfy such requirements and its ability to borrow 
additional funds using the same debt as collateral further show that the 
arrangement is a loan, not a transfer.238  A judge applying this factor would 
consider whether the RMBS trust or sponsor (as potential lender) imposed 
restrictions like the ones listed above on the originator.  PSAs do not 
appear to explicitly restrict the originator’s operations.  Thus, this factor 
appears to indicate that RMBS trusts were tax owners of the mortgage 
notes. 
The sixth factor considers who has the power to dispose of an 
obligation.239  The lack of restrictions on the sale of a note suggests power 
of disposition.240  Arrangements that clearly allow one party to dispose of 
 
 235.  See, e.g., United Surgical Steel, 54 T.C. at 1230 (1970) (concluding that a 
petitioner’s relationship with a bank was that of a borrower and debtor on the basis of 
various restrictions placed upon the petitioner by the bank, including recording keeping 
requirements, rights of audit, and tax liability); Union Planters Nat’l Bank of Memphis v. 
United States, 426 F.2d 115, 117, 118 (6th Cir. 1970) (concluding that for tax liability 
purposes, the economic substance of the transaction, including what restrictions banks place 
to prevent loss of principal, are what determines whether a particular set of transactions 
qualify as sales or secured loans); Yancey Bros. Co. v. United States, 319 F. Supp. 441, 446 
(1970) (evaluating restrictions imposed by the lenders upon a taxpayer who utilized a 
customer’s installment payments as security for demand loans from the bank to determine 
whether tax liability results from this form of securitization). 
 236.  United Surgical Steel, 54 T.C. at 1230 (1970). 
 237.  See Union Planters, 426 F.2d at 117-118 (noting that the bank involved in the case 
went to significant lengths to ensure that it did not bear the risk of loss); Yancey Bros., 319 
F. Supp. at 446 (noting that the taxpayer loan agreements at issue in the case required a 
105% collateral to debt ratio to be maintained as part of the note’s conditions, while using it 
to evaluate whether the events in the case amount to a taxable transaction or event). 
 238.  See Yancey Bros., 319 F. Supp. at 446 (discussing taxpayer’s ability to borrow 
additional funds, including the ability to consolidate existing debt into a single borrowing 
note without the addition of more collateral). 
 239.  See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (concluding that 
one of the factors to determine if a transfer is a sale includes an evaluation of which party 
had the power of disposition); Tech. Adv Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998) (stating that one 
factor to consider in deciding if a transaction is a sale includes determining whether or not 
the party had power of disposition). 
 240.  See Rev. Rul. 82-144, 1982-2 C.B. 34 (ruling that taxpayer was free to dispose of 
obligations at any time despite puts on the obligations). 
BORDEN AND REISS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/14  10:03 AM 
706 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16:3 
 
notes even if they are in the possession of another party also suggest power 
of disposition.241  The rights to dispose of notes, to transfer the registration 
of the notes, and to keep interest due on the notes point to the person who 
has the power to dispose of notes.242  In cases that rely upon this factor, the 
originators of notes could dispose of the notes if they replaced the collateral 
or had sufficient other collateral to secure the lender’s right to 
repayment.243  For example, a manufacturer could sell notes if the value of 
the remaining notes it held were sufficient to satisfy the lender who held a 
security interest in the notes.244  In other cases, courts consider whether one 
party has complete dominion of an asset in determining power of 
disposition.245  The pre-financial crisis RMBS arrangements do not 
squarely align with any of these cases.  Neither the RMBS trusts, the 
originators, nor the sponsors appear to have had complete dominion over 
the mortgage notes. 
Without possession of the mortgage notes, a person cannot transfer 
possession of the notes.  An RMBS trust that did not have possession of 
notes could sell the rights it had under PSAs to receive payments, but it 
could not transfer all of the interests and rights in negotiable mortgage 
notes prior to taking possession of them.246  Therefore, an RMBS trust that 
 
 241.  See, e.g., Union Planters, 426 F.2d at 117 (holding that the owner was the party 
that listed the bonds for sale, in spite of a formal distinction and concession by the 
government that the Bank held formal title to the bonds as a matter of property law); Am. 
Nat’l Bank v. United States, 421 F.2d 442, 452 (5th Cir. 1970) (recognizing that dealers 
held complete dominion over bonds as they came into possession of the lending bank, and 
dealers could sell the bonds at any time to the dealers’ customers). 
 242.  See Calloway v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1315, 1327-30 (11th Cir. 2012) (evaluating the 
rights of respective purported owners of securities to determine whether or not the 
transaction constituted a sale for tax liability purposes, including evaluating factors such as 
entitlement to receive benefits from the transaction that resulted, the right to sell or transfer 
the notes without the permission of the original owner and transferor, among others); 
Sollberger v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1119, 1125-27 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding that petitioner 
Sollberger’s claims that a transaction he engaged in was not a sale for tax purposes were not 
valid because the transaction amounted to sale of his floating rate notes to another party, 
thereby imposing capital gains tax liability and implicitly suggesting he had powers of 
disposition of the floating rate notes at issue). 
 243.  See Town and Country Food Co., Inc. v. Comm’r, 51 T.C. 1049 (holding that use 
of installments paid by customers to secure loans from a third party was not a sale or 
disposition which obligated reporting of gains under section 453(d) of the tax code). 
 244.  See Town and Country, 51 T.C. at 1049. 
 245.  See Bailey v. Comm’r, 912 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the party that 
had the exclusive right in a film to control distribution, determine the title, date of initial 
release, advertise, make copies, possess, and distribute to various media was the owner of 
the film). 
 246.  See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, REPORT ON 
APPLICATION OF THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE TO SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO MORTG. 
NOTES AT 5-6 (November 14, 2011), available at 
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lacked possession could not transfer the negotiable note to someone who 
would become a holder in due course.247  A rational buyer would not pay 
fair market value for a negotiable note that did not bestow upon it rights of 
a holder in due course.  Furthermore, the REMIC rules generally prohibit 
RMBS trusts from transferring any mortgage notes.248  PSAs also generally 
prohibit RMBS trusts from transferring any mortgage note they hold to 
ensure that they comply with the REMIC rules.249  Thus, as a practical 
matter, RMBS trusts probably cannot dispose of mortgage notes, 
undermining the position that they are tax owners of the notes. 
The originator and RMBS trust would confer very different rights 
upon potential purchasers of the notes.  A person who purchased the note 
from the originator could become a holder of the note and be entitled to 
enforce it.250  In fact, the originator could sell an untransferred mortgage 
note to other purchasers who could become a holder of the mortgage note 
in due course.251  A holder in due course who purchased a mortgage note 
 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Committees_Materials/PEBUCC/PEB_Report_111411.
pdf (noting that pursuant to U.C.C. section 3-301, one must possess or have formerly 
possessed a note to be a person entitled to enforce it). The situation with non-negotiable 
notes is very different.  See Dale A. Whitman & Drew Milner, Foreclosing on Nothing: The 
Curious Problem of the Deed of Trust Foreclosure Without Entitlement To Enforce the 
Note, 66 ARK. L. REV. 21, 27 (2013) (“It is clear that, unlike a negotiable instrument, 
enforcement rights in a nonnegotiable note can be transferred by a separate document of 
assignment.”). 
 247.  See U.C.C. § 1-201 (2005) (defining a “holder” as one in possession). 
 248.  See I.R.C. § 860F(a)(2) (noting that a prohibited transaction includes disposition of 
qualified mortgages transferred to the REMIC with a limited set of exceptions). 
 249.  See, e.g., Pooling And Servicing Agreement for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 
2006-3 and Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-3, by and among Long Beach Securities 
Corp., Depositor, Long Beach Mortgage Company, Seller And Master Servicer and 
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Trustee (dated as of April 1, 2006), at 190 
available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1355515/000127727706000388/psalongbeach_200
63.pdf (discussing various prohibited transactions and activities barring depositors, master 
servicers, and trustees from disposing of mortgage notes with limited exceptions, with 
intentions of avoiding prohibited transactions). 
 250.  See U.C.C. § 3-301 (2002) (listing the persons entitled to enforce such a note). 
 251.  See U.C.C. § 3-302(a)(2002): 
“[H]older in due course” means the holder of an instrument if:  (1) the 
instrument when issued or negotiated to the holder does not bear such apparent 
evidence of forgery or alteration or is not otherwise so irregular or incomplete 
as to call into question its authenticity; and (2) the holder took the instrument (i) 
for value, (ii) in good faith, (iii) without notice that the instrument is overdue or 
has been dishonored or that there is an uncured default with respect to payment 
of another instrument issued as part of the same series, (iv) without notice that 
the instrument contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered, (v) 
without notice of any claim to the instrument described in Section 3-306, and 
(vi) without notice that any party has a defense or claim in recoupment 
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from an originator following a purported transfer to an RMBS trust would 
have greater rights in a mortgage note than the RMBS trust.252  The RMBS 
trust’s recourse in such a situation would be against the originator for 
breach of contract and possibly theft.253  Thus, the originator who retains 
possession of a mortgage note has the power to dispose of the note, but the 
RMBS trust only has power to transfer some of the rights under the note.254  
A good faith transferee of the mortgage note from the originator would 
have more rights than a good faith transferee of the RMBS trust’s rights in 
the note. In fact, as RMBS litigation proceeds and additional facts emerge, 
finding that originators sold single notes to multiple buyers would not be 
surprising.255   Neither originators nor RMBS trusts have carte blanche to 
dispose of the notes, so this factor does not appear to weigh conclusively in 
either direction.  The factor is probably more damning for the RMBS trusts, 
however, because they are seeking tax ownership. 
The seventh factor examines which party bears the risk of loss.256  
This may be the most important factor in determining the tax owner of a 
mortgage note.257  In a private ruling, the IRS devoted considerable text to 
analyzing who bears the risk of loss in a loan securitization arrangement.258  
 
described in Section 3-305(a). 
 252.  See U.C.C. § 3-306 (2002): 
A person taking an instrument, other than a person having rights of a holder in 
due course, is subject to a claim of a property or possessory right in the 
instrument or its proceeds, including a claim to rescind a negotiation and to 
recover the instrument or its proceeds. A person having rights of a holder in due 
course takes free of the claim to the instrument. 
 253.  See KRAVITT, supra note 53, § 16.04. 
 254.  See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-52-002 (Sep. 16, 1985) (ruling privately that the 
facts and circumstances determined that the party in possession of assets was not the tax 
owner).  The IRS also considers contractual repurchase agreements and tacit understanding 
of parties in determining who is the tax owner of an asset. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-
52-002 (Sep. 16, 1985). 
 255.  See JOHN ARNHOLZ & EDWARD E. GAINOR, OFFERINGS OF ASSET-BACKED 
SECURITIES 14-34 (2013): 
Outright fraud is probably unlikely when the parties are well known to each 
other and a transaction is as highly publicized as a typical MBS offering. But 
the risk of an inadvertent transfer of mortgage loans should not be lightly 
dismissed. The authors recall too many occasions on which a client called to 
report the discovery that assets purportedly transferred had been pledged or sold 
to another party. 
 256.  I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001; see I.R.S. Tech. Adv. 
Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998). 
 257.  See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998) (“[T]here is no real 
opportunity for gain due to lower than expected prepayments. Thus, who bears the risk of 
loss must determine whether the transaction is a sale or secured financing.”). 
 258.  See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. 
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The IRS identified both credit risk and prepayment risk as types of risk that 
accompany mortgage securitization.259  Credit risk is the risk that borrowers 
will not make payments as provided in the loan agreements.260  Prepayment 
risk is the risk that borrowers will refinance when interest rates go down 
and pay off existing mortgage notes before their maturity dates and that the 
holder of a note will hold a note with a below-market yield if the interest 
rates go up.261  Another risk of securitization is modification risk.262  
Modification risk is the risk that the borrower will modify the loan to 
reduce the amount of monthly payments.263 
A mortgage securitization arrangement can transfer any 
combination of such risks from the originator or provide that the originator 
will retain any combination of the risks.  For example, if an originator 
retains the most junior tranches of certificates issued with respect to an 
RMBS trust or it agrees to repurchase defective mortgages, it retains most 
of the credit risk.264  Many RMBS trusts had been structured this way,265 so 
originators often retained the credit risk by retaining junior RMBS 
tranches.  The parties to a securitization arrangement can transfer the 
prepayment risk and modification risk to the holders of more senior 
tranches if they require RMBS trusts to use available funds to pay the 
holders of senior tranches first.266  In fact, the economic incentives that 
accompany different types of risk affect investors’ behavior and 
preferences.267  Investors who hold senior RMBS tranches bear most of the 
 
Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998). 
 259.  See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (noting that 
mortgage loans present dual risks of credit risk and prepayment risk). 
 260.  See id. (discussing credit risk and prepayment risk in the context of mortgage 
loans). 
 261.  See id. 
 262.  See Nuveen Investments, Prospectus for Nuveen Mortgage Opportunity Term Fund 
2 at 78 (Feb. 3, 2010), available at 
https://www2.morganstanley.com/wealth/Markets/IPOCenter/Prospectus/?DocID=p_JMTC
E. 
 263.  See id. 
 264.  See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001). 
 265.  See Ingo Fender & Janet Mitchell, Incentives and Tranche Retention in 
Securitisation: A Screening Model 4 n.4 (BIS Working Papers No 289, May, 2009), 
available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/events/cbrworkshop09/fendermitchell.pdf (“[I]n early 
securitizations, originators would routinely hold on to the equity piece of their 
transactions. . . . . [E]quity tranches, even when originally retained, were increasingly sold 
or hedged”). 
 266.  See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (ruling privately 
that a sufficient amount of the economic benefits and burdens transferred to warrant treating 
the arrangement as a transfer for tax purposes). 
 267.  See SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS, 60-62 (2012): 
What the FDIC staff understood early on—frankly, before anyone else—was 
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prepayment risk; investors in junior tranches or the originator bear most of 
the credit risk.268  Margin accounts, repurchase agreements, and other 
mechanisms can also influence who bears the risk of loss. Thus, 
determining who bears the risk of loss is fact-specific. 
The IRS privately ruled in a non-REMIC mortgage securitization 
that the trust bore the prepayment risk and the originator bore the credit 
risk.269  Similarly, in REMIC mortgage securitization, originators and 
REMICs each bear risk.  Originators of the loans conveyed to many RMBS 
trusts agree to repurchase the mortgage notes that do not satisfy 
underwriting requirements.270  Indeed, originators created reserves to cover 
the estimated costs they would incur as a result of the risks they retained.271  
Even though RMBS sponsors retained repurchase settlement payments,272 
suggesting that the RMBS trust bore the risk of loss, courts will most likely 
hold the RMBS sponsors liable for paying those proceeds to the RMBS 
trusts.  Courts will also likely enforce the PSAs and hold originators liable 
for repurchasing or replacing the defective mortgage notes.  Thus, in the 
case of an RMBS trust knowingly formed with defective mortgage notes, 
the RMBS trust would not bear the risk of loss of the mortgage notes.  
Many RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien mortgage 
RMBS trust, would not bear the risk of loss of mortgage notes. 
The eighth factor considers which party had the potential for 
gain.273  The IRS observed that the potential for gain is the obverse of 
bearing risk.274  Consequently, one might conclude that if the originator or 
sponsor bore the risk of loss, the RMBS trust might have the potential for 
gain.  The application of this factor to RMBS trusts is unclear, especially if 
the parties wanted to qualify for REMIC classification.  A REMIC does not 
have the opportunity to profit from the disposition of mortgage notes.  If 
 
that the usual forces of economic self-interest would not result in the kind of 
wide-scale restructuring that was needed to avoid a massive wave of 
foreclosures.  That was because through the securitization process, those who 
owned the mortgages were different from those who would be responsible for 
restructuring them and the legal contracts governing the modification process 
created economic incentives skewed in favor of foreclosure. 
 268.  See KRAVITT, supra note 53, § 16.02. 
 269.  See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001). 
 270.  See ARNHOLZ & GAINOR, supra note 255, at § 1.04. 
 271.  See DOLAN & DAVIS, supra note 52, at § 7.01. 
 272.  See J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 27-28 (discussing how 
funds from confidential settlements for toxic debt were retained by the bank instead of being 
credited to the affected RMBS trusts). 
 273.  I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998); see I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. 
Mem. 2001-30-2009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (analyzing the potential for gain on the mortgage 
loans). 
 274.  I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001). 
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the notes appreciate in value and a REMIC sells the notes, any gain it 
recognizes will be taxed at 100%.275  Because the tax would consume any 
gain, the REMICs have no potential for gain from the mortgage notes.  The 
IRS has also concluded that if there is no real opportunity for gain, “who 
bears the risk of loss must determine whether the transaction is a sale or 
secured financing.”276  RMBS trusts appear to provide no real opportunity 
for lawfully acquired gain from the mortgage notes, so the focus is on the 
risk of loss instead of the potential for gain.  Nonetheless, REMIC-intended 
RMBS trusts’ inability to profit from the disposition of mortgage notes 
suggests they are not the tax owners of the mortgage notes. 
Table 1 summarizes the tax-ownership analysis of the hypothetical 
second-lien mortgage RMBS trust using the eight factors for ownership 
discussed above.  The summary suggests that the IRS could make a strong 
case that many RMBS trusts, especially the hypothetical second-lien 
RMBS trust, were not the tax owners of the mortgage notes. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Factors Applied to Hypothetical RMBS Trust 
    
Factor RMBS Trust Owned the Note 
RMBS Trust Did 
Not Own the 
Note 
Direction 
Balance Leans 
(1) Did parties 
treat the 
transaction as a 
sale? 
PSA provided 
that originator 
transferred notes; 
federal tax 
accounting of 
interest and 
principal. 
Originators 
retained 
possession of 
notes; transfer 
not recorded; 
recording fees 
not paid; sponsor 
retained 
settlement 
payment. 
RMBS trust 
not tax owner. 
(2) Were obligors 
notified of 
transfer of 
obligation? 
Loan documents 
may provide for 
possibility of 
assignment. 
No public record 
of assignment; 
perhaps no direct 
notification. 
RMBS trust 
not tax owner. 
(3) Which party 
serviced the 
obligation? 
 Affiliate of 
originator 
serviced the 
obligation. 
RMBS trust 
not tax owner. 
 
 275.  I.R.C. § 860F(a)(2)(A). 
 276.  I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 2012). 
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Table 1: Summary of Factors Applied to Hypothetical RMBS Trust 
    
Factor RMBS Trust Owned the Note 
RMBS Trust Did 
Not Own the 
Note 
Direction 
Balance Leans 
(4) Did payments 
to the transferee 
correspond to 
collections on the 
debt instrument? 
Principal and 
interest payments 
to RMBS trust 
corresponded to 
collections. 
Settlement 
payments for 
defective loans 
did not 
correspond to 
sponsor’s 
collection of 
those payments. 
Not apparent. 
(5) Did the 
transferee impose 
restrictions on the 
operations of the 
transferor? 
No distinctive 
restrictions 
imposed. 
 RMBS trust 
tax owner. 
(6) Which party 
had power of 
disposition? 
Originator could 
transfer 
possession of the 
notes. 
PSA restricted 
RMBS trust’s 
right to transfer 
notes; tax law 
penalizes 
transfers; RMBS 
trust did not have 
possession of 
notes. 
Not apparent. 
(7) Which party 
bears the risk of 
loss? 
 PSA obligated 
RMBS trust to 
cure defective 
loans, and many 
loans were 
defective. 
RMBS trust 
not tax owner. 
(8) Which party 
has the potential 
for gain? 
Originator could 
not dispose of 
mortgage notes 
for gain. 
100% tax on 
gains from 
dispositions 
prohibits RMBS 
trust from 
realizing gain. 
RMBS trust 
not tax owner. 
 
In addition to applying the multiple-factor test for tax ownership to 
mortgage notes, the courts and IRS may also estop purported RMBS trusts 
from arguing that they are owners of notes that they do not possess.  Courts 
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and the IRS apply a substance-over-form doctrine to disregard the form 
taxpayers choose if the form does not reflect the economic substance of the 
transaction.277  They generally do not, however, allow taxpayers to rely 
upon a substance argument to take a position that differs from the 
taxpayer’s chosen form.278  If RMBS trusts and originators chose not to 
transfer the mortgage notes to the trusts, the principle of estoppel weakens 
the trusts’ arguments that they were tax owners of notes of which they 
chose not to take possession. 
Commentators anticipate that RMBS trusts may argue that the 
REMIC rules merely require the REMIC to be the beneficial owner of the 
obligations.279  That argument fails because beneficial ownership is 
analogous to tax ownership, and courts apply the Grodt & McKay benefits 
and burdens test to determine who is the beneficial owner of property.280  In 
 
 277.  See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)  (applying a substance-over-
form approach to assess corporate reorganization). 
 278.  See, e.g., Branham v. Comm’r, 51 T.C. 175, 175 (1968) (finding that the taxpayer’s 
assignment of a note was “absolute on its face” and holding that the taxpayer had transferred 
the note); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998) (“Taxpayer would be bound 
by the form of its transactions if it were the first to assert that its transactions were 
[something other than the chosen form]”). 
 279.  See Borden & Reiss, supra note 161, at 278; Lee A. Sheppard, The Crazy Train of 
Mortgage Securitization, TAX NOTES 639, 645 (Nov. 8, 2010).  Beneficial ownership often 
appears in the trust context, but even in that context, it closely relates to the concept of tax 
ownership.  See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (8th ed. 2004) (defining beneficial 
owner as “[o]ne recognized in equity as the owner of something because use and title belong 
to that person, even though legal title may belong to someone else; esp., one for whom 
property is held in trust.”).  The tax statute provides that qualified mortgage includes “any 
participation or certificate of beneficial ownership” in an obligation.  I.R.C. § 
860G(a)(3)(A).   
 The REMIC regulations refer to beneficial ownership in two places.  First, they 
prohibit a disqualified organization from acquiring beneficial ownership of a residual 
interest in a REMIC.  Treas. Reg. § 1.860D-1(b)(5)(i)(B).  That reference does not, of 
course, address the tax ownership of an obligation. Second, they provide that the definition 
of “obligations secured by interests in real property” includes “other investment trust 
interests that represent undivided beneficial ownership in a pool of obligations principally 
secured by interests in real property and related assets that would be considered to be 
permitted investments if the investment trust were a REMIC.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-
2(a)(5).  That reference is clearly to an interest in a trust. If the originator holds the 
mortgage notes, a purported REMIC would have to establish that the originator held the 
mortgage notes in trust and that the trust was an investment trust to rely upon that rule. The 
documents used to create the REMICs do not appear to make any provisions for the 
originator to be trustee, and the originators probably would not come within the definition of 
investment trust.  Furthermore, such a claim would contradict representations in the REMIC 
offering documents, which did not provide that the originator would hold the mortgage 
notes in trust. 
 280.  See, e.g., Estate of Kenneth L. Lay v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 202 (2011) 
(“The status of the legal title to the annuity contracts does not control in determining 
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fact, defendants in upstream litigation acknowledge that tax ownership is 
the appropriate test to apply in determining whether a purported REMIC is 
the owner of the obligations.281  Beneficial ownership would be relevant to 
an RMBS trust only if the originator held the mortgage note in trust for the 
RMBS trust.282 
If an RMBS trust fails to establish that it is the tax owner of 
mortgage notes, tax law must re-characterize the arrangement.  If a 
purported REMIC received and distributed proceeds, it would own some 
sort of asset capable of generating cash flow.  That asset could be a loan 
from the originator, the sponsor or another party to the securitization.  The 
security for such a loan could be mortgage notes that would come within 
the definition of qualified mortgage.  But such a loan does not itself come 
within that definition.283  Because the asset would be something other than 
a qualified mortgage, the arrangement would fail to be a REMIC. 
This analysis suggests that a court would likely find that many 
RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, were not 
the tax owners of mortgage notes.  The facts of some RMBS trusts may 
 
whether a sale occurred.  Beneficial ownership, and not legal title, determines ownership for 
Federal income tax purposes.”); Ragghianti v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 346 (1978), aff’d, without 
published opinion, 652 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1981); Pac. Coast Music Jobbers, Inc. v. Comm’r, 
55 T.C. 866, 874 (1971), aff’d, 457 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1972).  
The federal income tax consequences of property ownership generally depend upon 
beneficial ownership rather than possession of mere legal title. Speca v. Comm’r, 630 F.2d 
554, 556-57 (7th Cir. 1980), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1979-120; Beirne v. Comm’r, 61 T.C. 268, 
277 (1973). “[C]ommand over property or enjoyment of its economic benefits, which is the 
mark of true ownership, is a question of fact to be determined from all of the attendant facts 
and circumstances.” Monahan v. Comm’r, 109 T.C. 235, 240 (1997) (internal quotations 
omitted) (quoting Hang v. Comm’r, 95 T.C. 74, 80 (1990)).  “[A] sale occurs upon the 
transfer of the benefits and burdens of ownership rather than upon the satisfaction of the 
technical requirements for the passage of title under State law.” Houchins v. Comm’r, 79 
T.C. 570, 590 (1982).  The determination of whether the benefits and burdens of ownership 
have been transferred is one of fact and is based on the intention of the parties, evidenced by 
their written agreements and the surrounding facts and circumstances.  Paccar, Inc. & Subs. 
v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 754, 777 (1985), aff’d, 849 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1988); Grodt & McKay 
Realty, Inc. v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. at 1237; Ragghianti, 71 T.C. at 349.  Beneficial ownership 
is marked by command over property or enjoyment of its economic benefits. Yelencsics v. 
Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1513, 1527 (1980) (holding that the entire interest in a stock was sold even 
though the title to the stock was not transferred). 
 281.  See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss the Compl., HSH Nordbank 
v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. 652678/2011,  24 n. 38 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty., May 11, 2012), 
available at 
https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/fbem/DocumentDisplayServlet?documentId=xKBnC5REEod
DnG7SCCByTg==&system=prod (addressing tax ownership as related to ownership of the 
obligations). 
 282.  See Borden & Reiss, supra note 161. 
 283.  See infra Part II.B. 
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nonetheless indicate that the RMBS trust is the tax owner of the mortgage 
notes.  In such cases the RMBS trusts may still fail to qualify as REMICs 
because they fail to satisfy other REMIC requirements.  As the following 
analysis indicates, the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust will almost 
certainly fail to satisfy other REMIC requirements.  The analysis also 
provides a template for analyzing REMIC classification for other RMBS 
trusts. 
B. Qualified Mortgage Requirement 
An RMBS trust must satisfy the qualified mortgage requirement to 
be a REMIC.284  A qualified mortgage is an obligation that is principally 
secured by an interest in real property.285  This definition has three 
elements: (1) obligation, (2) principally secured, and (3) secured by an 
interest in real property.  An asset must satisfy all three elements to be a 
qualified mortgage.  Many of the assets in RMBS trusts do not satisfy these 
elements. 
1. Obligation 
A qualified mortgage must be an “obligation (including any 
participation or certificate of beneficial ownership therein).”286  The 
REMIC rules do not specifically define obligation.  The common legal 
definition of obligation is “[a] legal or moral duty to do or not do 
something . . . . A formal, binding agreement or acknowledgment of a 
liability to pay a certain amount or to do a certain thing for a particular 
person or set of persons; esp., a duty arising by contract.”287  A mortgage 
note would satisfy this definition of obligation because the maker of the 
note agrees to pay a certain amount.  An originator’s promise under a PSA 
to transfer mortgage notes would also come within the definition of 
obligation.  Participation or certificates of beneficial ownership in an 
obligation include “non-REMIC pass-through certificates (including senior 
and subordinated pass-through certificates and IO [Interest Only] and PO 
[Principal Only] strips) . . . .”288  A pass-through certificate is an interest in 
a trust or other arrangement that holds a pool of mortgage notes or other 
debt instruments.289  IO and PO strips are types of stripped bonds and 
 
 284.  See supra Part II. 
 285.  I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A). 
 286.  Id. 
 287.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1104 (8th ed. 2004). 
 288.  See PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 169, at 456. 
 289.  Id. at 23. 
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coupons governed by section 1286 of the Internal Revenue Code, which 
grant a holder the rights to identified payments on bonds.290  Thus, a strip 
that grants an RMBS trust the right to receive certain payments due on an 
obligation principally secured by an interest in real property would appear 
to satisfy the definition of obligation.  These rules are consistent with the 
general definition of qualified mortgage, which includes any regular 
interest in another REMIC.291 
Because pre-financial crisis RMBS trusts received cash flow, they 
must have been the tax owners of some type of property.  Even if the 
properties RMBS trusts owned were not qualified mortgages, they could 
have been obligations.  For instance, it could be an obligation from the 
originator to transfer mortgage notes and to transfer payments on the notes.  
Such an obligation would not be a pass-through certificate, however, unless 
the arrangement with the originator was a trust.  This does not appear to 
have been the case, because PSAs do not create a trust on behalf of the 
RMBS trust.292 Thus, the properties owned by RMBS trusts seem to be 
either mortgage notes—for RMBS trusts that are the tax owners of the 
notes—or rights to receive something from the originator.  The properties 
owned by an RMBS trust could therefore be binding obligations, even if 
they are not mortgage notes per se. Obligations in a form other than 
mortgage notes would not satisfy other elements of the definition of 
qualified mortgage because they would not be principally secured by an 
interest in real property. 
2. Principally Secured 
An obligation is principally secured only if it (1) satisfies the 80% 
test, (2) satisfies the alternative test, or (3) comes within the reasonable-
belief safe harbor.293  As the following discussion illustrates, the lending 
and underwriting practices during the years leading up to the financial 
crisis will have prohibited many mortgage notes from being principally 
secured under any of those three alternatives.  Any other obligation that an 
RMBS trust might hold will also fail to satisfy any one of the tests. 
 
 290.  Id. at 438.  A stripped bond is a bond that separates the ownership of the bond from 
any coupons or interest that have not yet come due, and a stripped coupon is the coupon 
related to the bond. Id. at 701. 
 291.  I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(C). 
 292.  See Borden & Reiss, supra note 14, at 277-279. 
 293.  Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(1). 
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a. The 80% Test 
An obligation satisfies the 80% test only if the fair market value of 
the interest in real property securing the obligation is at least 80% of the 
adjusted issue price of the obligation on one of the following two dates: (1) 
the obligation’s origination date,294 or (2) the date the trust acquires the 
obligation by contribution.295  In other words, the 80% test compares the 
value of the collateral to the amount of a loan, so it considers the value-to-
loan (VTL) ratio of a mortgage note.  The VTL ratio is the inverse of the 
LTV ratio that RMBS sponsors and investors use.  The 80% test requires 
the VTL ratio of a loan to be at least 80%.  Two definitions are key to 
computing the VTL ratio:  the definition of adjusted issue price and the 
definition of the fair market value of the collateral. 
The REMIC rules do not define adjusted issue price of an 
obligation.  Instead, the rules rely on the definitions of “adjusted issue 
price” in other areas of tax law, particularly in the original issue discount 
(OID) rules.296  One such definition provides that the adjusted issue price of 
a debt instrument is the instrument’s issue price at the beginning of its first 
accrual period.297  The issue price for a home mortgage should be the 
amount of the loan.298  After the first accrual period, the adjusted issue price 
is the issue price increased by any original issue discount that any holder of 
the instrument included in income and decreased by any payments other 
than qualified stated interest made on the instrument.299  The adjustments 
that occur between the origination of a loan, and a transfer of it to an 
RMBS trust normally should not significantly affect the adjusted issue 
price of the mortgage note because transfers generally occur shortly after 
origination.300  This analysis assumes that the adjusted issue price is the 
amount of the loan. 
The definition of fair market value in the 80% test applies on a 
property-by-property basis.  The test assigns the value of property first to 
senior liens.  The amount assigned to senior liens reduces the fair market 
 
 294.  Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)-(b). 
 295.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(1)(i)(B) (qualifying obligations that are at least 
equal to 80 percent of the adjusted issue price of the obligation at the time the sponsor 
contributes the obligation to the REMIC as meeting the 80-percent test). 
 296.  See PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 167, at 455, 58. 
 297.  Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-1(b)(1). 
 298.  See I.R.C. § 1273(b)(2) (noting that the issue price of a debt instrument not issued 
for property and not publically offered is the price paid by the first buyer of the instrument); 
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-2(g)(5), Example 1 (deducting points from the borrower’s 
payment to determine issue price). 
 299.  Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-1(b)(1)(i), (ii). 
 300.  See supra Part I. 
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value of the interest in real property assigned to other liens.301 Other liens 
that are on par with the obligation being tested further reduce the fair 
market value of the interest in real property in proportion to the liens with 
similar priority.302  The computation of fair market value required by these 
rules could cause many second-lien mortgages (and primary mortgages for 
that matter) to fail to satisfy the 80% test. Inflated appraisals were common 
in years leading up to the financial crisis,303 and will thus cause many 
mortgages to fail the 80% test. 
An example illustrates how senior liens can cause many second 
and other subordinate liens to fail the 80% test.  Say the originator of an 
obligation treats an appraised value of $250,000 as the fair market value of 
a house.  Based upon that appraisal, the originator lends a buyer $200,000 
secured by a first-lien mortgage on the house and $37,500 secured by a 
second-lien mortgage on the house (the borrower paid the remaining 
$12,500 of the purchase price).304  The appraised fair market value suggests 
that both the first and the second mortgages satisfy the 80% test.  Applying 
the test to the first mortgage, the fair market value of the house would be 
the full $250,000.  The VTL ratio of the first mortgage is the $250,000 
appraised value divided by the $200,000 mortgage or 125%, which is 
greater than the required 80%, thus allowing the first-lien mortgage to 
satisfy the 80% test.  The fair market value apportioned to the second-lien 
mortgage for purposes of the 80% test is $50,000 ($250,000 total fair 
market value minus the $200,000 first mortgage).  The VTL ratio for the 
second mortgage is 133% ($50,000 fair market value to $37,500 loan).  
Because 133% is greater than the required 80%, the second mortgage also 
satisfies the 80% test. 
If appraisers overstated the values of homes in this example, and 
the $250,000 house is only worth $225,000 (just 90% of the appraised 
value) at the time the buyer borrowed the first or second mortgage,305 then 
the actual value, not the inflated appraised value, is appropriate for the 80% 
test.306 Using the actual value of the collateral, the first-lien mortgage still 
 
 301.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(2). 
 302.  See id. 
 303.  See supra Part II.B.2.a. 
 304.  The issuance of a first and second mortgage to home purchasers was typical during 
the period leading up to the economic meltdown in 2008. See Vikas Bajaj, Equity Loans as 
Next Round in Credit Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/27/business/27loan.html?pagewanted=print (noting the 
higher risk of loss in second liens). 
 305.  The $250,000 appraised value represents approximately 11% overstated value 
($25,000 ÷ $225,000).  Such inflation was not uncommon leading up to the financial crisis.  
See supra Part II.B.2.a. 
 306.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(1)(i) (referring to fair market value of the collateral). 
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satisfies the 80% test because it uses the full $225,000 actual fair market 
value, which exceeds the $200,000 first mortgage.  The VTL ratio for the 
first mortgage is 112.5% ($225,000 value divided by the $200,000 loan). 
The value for purposes of the second mortgage, however, is $225,000 
minus the $200,000 first-lien mortgage, or $25,000. The VTL ratio for the 
$37,500 second mortgage using that $25,000 value is 67% ($25,000 value 
divided by the $37,500 loan).  Because the 67% VTL ratio of the second-
lien mortgage is less than the required 80% VTL ratio, the second-lien 
mortgage does not satisfy the 80% test. 
Studies of mortgages suggest that more than a significant 
percentage of second-lien mortgage loans would not satisfy the 80% test.307  
 
 307.  It was not uncommon for homebuyers to borrow close to 100% of the appraised 
value of the home.  See Dov Solomon & Odelia Minnes, Non-Recourse, No Down Payment 
and the Mortgage Meltdown: Lessons from Undercapitalization, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 529, 541-542 (2011).  For example, a borrower might take a first mortgage for 80% 
of the appraised value of the home and a second mortgage for 20% of the appraised value of 
the home (an 80-20 financing).  Assuming the first mortgage was 80% of the value of the 
home and a second mortgage was 20% of the value of the home with such arrangements, a 
4.001% discrepancy between the appraised value and the actual value would cause the 
second mortgage to fail the 80% test.  For instance, if the appraised value of a home was 
$100,000, the second mortgage would be for $20,000.  The VTL ratio of the second home 
would be less than 80% if the actual value of the home was only $95,999 instead of the 
appraised $100,000.  If the actual value were $95,999, to value assigned to the $20,000 
second mortgage for the purpose of the 80% test would be $15,999 ($95,999 total actual 
value minus the $80,000 first mortgage).  The VTL ratio of the second mortgage in such a 
situation would be 79.995% ($15,999 value to $20,000 loan).  These calculations suggest 
that if the appraised value was just 4.2% greater than the actual value ($4,001 ÷ $95,999), 
the second mortgage on a 100%-financed home would not satisfy the 80% test.  Based upon 
reports that appraised values were often at least 20% greater than the actual value of the 
homes, many mortgages would fail to satisfy the 80% test.  See, e.g., Griffin & Maturana, 
supra note 3 (finding that appraisal overstatements of at least 20% occurred in 14.5% of 
studied loans). 
Instead of being an 80-20 arrangement, the arrangement could have been an 80-10-
10 arrangement with a first mortgage equal to 80% of the home’s appraised value and a 
second and third mortgage each equal to 10% of the home’s appraised value.  If the first and 
second mortgage had priority over the third, the third mortgage would not satisfy the 80% if 
the actual value was only 2.01% less than the appraised value.  To illustrate, a homebuyer 
would borrow $100,000 to purchase a home with an appraised value of $100,000.  The third 
mortgage in an 80-10-10 arrangement would be $10,000.  The third mortgage would not 
satisfy the 80% test if the value of the property were less than $98,000 because the actual 
value assigned to the third mortgage would be the $97,999 (for example) actual value minus 
the $90,000 total amount of the first and second mortgages, which would make the VTL 
ratio for the third mortgage less than 80% (e.g., $7,999 actual to a $10,000 loan is a only 
79.99% VTL ratio). 
 If the mortgages in an 80-20 or 90-10-10 had equal priority, the actual value of the 
property would have to be less than 80% of the appraised value for any mortgage to fail the 
80% test.  For instance, the value assigned to the 80% loan in a $100,000 80-20 arrangement 
would be 80% of the actual value of the property, and the value assigned to the 20% loan 
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A study examining combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratios of pooled 
mortgages indicates that many loans held by RMBS trusts may not satisfy 
the 80% test.308  The CLTV ratio compares the combined principal balance 
of all liens on the mortgaged property to the value of the mortgaged 
property.309  Because LTV is the inverse of the VTL ratio, a VTL ratio of 
80% equals an LTV ratio of 125%.310 Take for example a property with an 
$80,000 fair market value that secures a $100,000 loan.  The VTL ratio for 
that property and obligation is 80% ($80,000 value divided by the $100,000 
loan).  The LTV ratio for that property and obligation is 125% ($100,000 
loan divided by the $80,000 value).  If the VTL ratio of a property and 
obligation is less than 80%, the obligation will not satisfy the 80% test.  
Inversely, if the LTV of a property is greater than 125%, the obligation 
secured by the property will not satisfy the 80% test.   
The CLTV ratio includes all mortgages secured by a piece of 
property, but it does not provide information with respect to individual 
loans.311  A study found that the CLTV ratio was greater than 100% for as 
many as 34% of the loans in one RMBS trust.312  A CLTV of greater than 
100% suggests that any second-lien mortgages in the pool may not satisfy 
the 80% test.  In the example above, if the house secured a $200,000 first-
lien mortgage and a $37,500 second-lien mortgage, the combined loans 
would be $237,500.  If the value of the house were $250,000, the CLTV 
ratio for the property and obligations would be about 95% ($237,500 loan 
divided by $250,000 value).  The VTL ratio of the aggregate loans would 
be about 91% ($250,000 value divided by the $237,500 loan).  If, however, 
the value of the property were only $225,000, the CLTV ratio would be 
about 106% ($237,500 loan divided by $225,000 value).  The VLT ratio of 
the aggregate loans would be about 95% ($225,000 value divided by the 
 
would be 20% of the value of the property.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(2).  If the actual 
value of the property were $90,000 (90% of the appraised value), $72,000 of it would be 
assigned to the 80% loan, which would have been for $80,000, so the VTL ration would be 
90% ($72,000 of value to $80,000 of mortgage).  The VTL ratio for the $20,000 second 
mortgage would also be 90% because $18,000 (20% of $90,000) of the value would be 
assigned to it. 
 A diversified mortgage pool that has a ratio of first and subsequent mortgages that 
equals the ratio of such mortgages to the value of appraised property would most likely have 
more than a de minimis amount of mortgages that fail the 80% test. 
 308.  Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 96, at 28 (describing a study on 
CLTV ratios of pooled mortgages). 
 309.  See id. at 26 (explaining the meaning and application of the CLTV ration). 
 310.  See Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits, 57 F.R. 61293, T.D. 8458 (Dec. 
24, 1992). 
 311.  The CLTV ratio would also consider third mortgages and any other mortgages 
secured by the property. 
 312.  See Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 96, at 28. 
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$237,000 loan).  Nonetheless, the loan-by-loan analysis shows that some 
loans may not satisfy the 80% test. 
Because each loan is subject to the 80% test, a CLTV ratio of 
greater than 100% signals that one or more of the loans secured by the 
property may fail the 80% test.  Failure will often result because the fair 
market value of the property apportioned to the first-lien mortgage leaves a 
disproportionately small amount of the property value to apportion to the 
other mortgages.  If the first mortgage is for $200,000 (roughly 84% of the 
total amount of loans) and the actual value of the property is only 
$225,000, the first-lien mortgage is almost 89% of the actual value of the 
property.  Thus, only 11% of the value of the property is apportioned to the 
second-lien mortgage under the 80% test.  The disproportionately small 
amount of value assigned to the second-lien mortgage gives it a 150% LTV 
ratio ($37,500 loan divided by the $25,000 value) and a 67% VTL ratio 
($25,000 value divided by the $37,500 loan).  The second-lien mortgage 
thus does not satisfy the 80% test.  In fact, loans with lower priority that are 
part of a CLTV ratio that exceeds 100% will often fail the 80% test.313 
The study of CLTV ratios demonstrates that as many as 34% of 
randomly selected loans have CLTV ratios of greater than 100%.314  The 
number of loans in an RMBS trust of second-lien mortgages with LTV 
ratios of greater than 100% would most likely be even higher, and that fact 
does not bode well for REMIC classification if a trust holds $100,000,000 
of loans, and the CLTV ratio for 34% of the loans (based upon actual 
value) is greater than 100%.  With respect to $34,000,000 or 34% of the 
loans, a question arises about whether some of them fail the 80% test.  If 
$5,100,000, or 15% of the loans (based upon actual value), in that group 
are second-lien mortgages, and if half of those loans fail the 80% test, 
$2,550,000 or 2.55% of the loans in the portfolio would fail the 80% test.  
The percentage of mortgage notes that fail the 80% test would be even 
greater for RMBS trusts that hold only second-lien mortgage notes. 
As stated above, originators pressured appraisers to inflate values 
80% of the time.315  That practice suggests that the value of collateral could 
have been overstated for at least 80% of the second-lien loans.  Because the 
effect of overstated value of the collateral is magnified with respect to 
 
 313.  See supra text accompanying note 307 (applying the 80% test to arrangements with 
a single property securing multiple loans).  As illustrated in that discussion, the structure of 
the arrangement will often influence the effect of the 80% test.  If all loans secured by a 
piece of property have equal priority, the CLTV ratio would have to be greater than 125% 
for any of the loans to fail the 80% test.  If one or more loans have priority over other loans, 
a CLTV ratio of greater than 100% signals that one more of the loans probably does not 
satisfy the 80% test. 
 314.  See Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 96, at 28. 
 315.  See supra pp. Part II.B.2.a.. 
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second-lien mortgages, as many as 80% of the second-lien mortgages could 
have VTL ratios lower than 80%.  If that is the case, the vast majority of 
second-lien mortgages granted in the years leading up to the financial crisis 
will not pass the 80% test.  Such loans would be principally secured only if 
they pass the alternative test or come within the principally-secured safe 
harbor. 
b. The Alternative Test 
An obligation that does not satisfy the 80% test will nonetheless be 
principally secured by an interest in real property if the obligation satisfies 
the alternative test.  An obligation must meet two requirements to satisfy 
the alternative test.316  First, substantially all of the proceeds of the 
obligation must be used by the borrower to acquire, improve, or protect an 
interest in real property.317  Second, at the origination date, the only security 
for the obligation can be the property that the borrower acquired, improved, 
and protected with the loan proceeds.318  The test covers real estate 
construction or acquisition loans for property not appraised at the time of 
the loan.319 
The language in the preamble to the regulations raises the question 
of whether a loan for appraised property can satisfy the alternative test if it 
fails the 80% test. That language provides: 
[A] home improvement loan made in accordance with Title I of 
the National Housing Act would be considered to satisfy the 
principally secured standard even though one cannot readily 
demonstrate that the loan satisfied the 80-percent test because a 
property appraisal was not required at the time the loan was 
originated.320 
This language suggests that the alternative test only applies to loans that do 
not require an appraisal of the collateral, and is not a fall-back test for loans 
that fail the 80% test based on an inaccurate property value.  However, if 
the collateral is appraised, the 80% test would be the proper test.  Thus, any 
loan that includes an appraisal value of the property and fails the 80% test 
probably cannot rely upon the alternative test. 
 
 316.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(1)(ii). 
 317.  See id. 
 318.  See id. 
 319.  See PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 169, at 459. 
 320.  See Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits, 57 C.F.R. 61293, 61294, T.D. 
8458 (Dec. 24, 1992) (explaining how a home improvement loan can still satisfy the 80 
percent test). 
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Many loans issued before the financial crisis will not satisfy the 
alternative test.  During that period, many borrowers used proceeds from 
home equity loans for purposes other than acquiring, improving, and 
protecting interests in real property.  Estimates indicate that as many as 
40% of loans issued during years before the financial crisis were home 
equity loans that were not used to acquire, improve, or protect real 
property.321  These home equity loans would not satisfy the first part of the 
alternative test.  Borrowers often took a portion of a loan originated at the 
time of purchase in cash.322 If the amount of cash that the borrower 
received (or used for purposes other than to acquire, improve, or protect the 
real property) caused the portion of the loan used to acquire, improve, or 
protect the property to be less than substantial, the loan would not satisfy 
the alternative test. 
A loan will also fail the alternative test if property other than the 
real property that the borrower acquired, improved, or protected with the 
loan proceeds secures the loan.  A borrower’s personal liability for the 
obligation does not violate this rule of the alternative test.323  If the 
borrower offers other property as collateral, however, the loan would not 
satisfy the second requirement.  Determining whether loans are secured by 
other property requires an examination of each loan.  Even without that 
examination, many second-lien mortgage notes in RMBS trusts will fail the 
alternative test because borrowers used the proceeds for purposes other 
than acquiring, improving, or protecting the property.324  The borrowers 
also obtained appraisals (albeit inaccurate appraisals) for the property, 
suggesting the alternative test probably should not apply.  Consequently, 
 
 321.  See Atif R. Mian & Amir Sufi, House Prices, Home Equity-Based Borrowing, and 
the U.S. Household Leverage Crisis (Research Paper, May 21, 2010), at 19, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1397607: 
[O]ur findings are suggestive that a large fraction of home equity-based 
borrowing is used for consumption or home improvement.  This conclusion is 
consistent with survey evidence by Brady, Canner, and Maki (2000) who find 
that from 1998 to 1999, 40% of households cite home improvement as a reason 
for home equity extraction, and 39% cite consumer expenditures. 
 322.  See Hui Chen et al., Houses as ATMs? Mortgage Refinancing and Macroeconomic 
Uncertainty 2 (Working Paper, 2012), at 4, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2024392 
(“[O]n average about 70% of refinanced loans involve cash-out, and U.S. households 
extracted over $1.7 trillion of home equity via refinancing from 1993 to 2010, corresponding 
to 11.5% of new loan balances.”). 
 323.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(1)(ii) (stating that to meet requirements of the 
alternative test, the borrower must use the loan to acquire, improve, or protect specifically 
real property). 
 324.  See Chen et al., supra note 322 (demonstrating that borrowers are not using loans 
in accordance with standards of alternative test and giving estimates how frequently this 
occurs). 
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with respect to many second-lien mortgage notes, the mortgage notes will 
not satisfy the alternative test. 
c. The Reasonable-Belief Safe Harbor 
Obligations that fail both the 80% test and the alternative test will 
nonetheless be principally secured by an interest in real property if they 
come within the reasonable-belief safe harbor.  The reasonable-belief safe 
harbor treats an obligation as being principally secured by an interest in 
real property if, at the time the sponsor contributes the obligation to a 
REMIC, the sponsor reasonably believes the obligation satisfies the 80% 
test or the alternative test.325  A sponsor may base reasonable belief on 
representations and warranties made by the originator.326  Alternatively, a 
sponsor may base a reasonable belief on evidence indicating that the 
originator typically made mortgages in accordance with an established set 
of parameters, and that any mortgage loan originated in accordance with 
those parameters would satisfy the 80% test or the alternative test.327  This 
safe harbor does not apply if the sponsor actually knew, or had reason to 
know, that an obligation failed both the 80% test and the alternative test.328  
Thus, in addition to showing reasonable belief, the sponsor must be able to 
show lack of actual knowledge and lack of reason to know that an 
obligation does not meet one of the other tests for the obligation to qualify 
for safe harbor protection. 
Sponsors’ only hope to come within the reasonable-belief safe 
harbor is to demonstrate that they based their reasonable belief on 
representations and warranties made by the originator.  They could not 
argue that they based their reasonable belief on evidence indicating 
originators made mortgages in accordance with established parameters that 
would satisfy the 80% test, because evidence at the time indicated that 
originators abandoned underwriting guidelines and made loans that could 
not satisfy the 80% test.329  Sponsors also knew, or had reason to know, that 
the loans they were securitizing could not pass the 80% test.  In the years 
leading up to the financial crisis, sponsors acknowledged the low quality of 
the mortgages that they were securitizing.330  Nonetheless, they continued 
to put them into RMBS trusts.331 
 
 325.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(3)(i). 
 326.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(3)(ii)(A) (affirming that a sponsor’s reasonable 
belief can be founded on representations or warranties made by the originator). 
 327.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(3)(ii)(B). 
 328.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(3)(i). 
 329.  See supra Part II.B.2.a. 
 330.  See Bajaj, supra note 106 (illustrating that the sponsors were aware of their subpar 
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Even where sponsors can prove a reasonable belief that mortgage 
notes satisfied the 80% or alternative test, if a purported REMIC later 
discovers that an obligation is not principally secured by an interest in real 
property, the obligation is defective, and loses qualified mortgage status 
within ninety days of the discovery date.332  The rules give sponsors those 
ninety days to cure defective loans.333   
Sponsors knew that they were transferring defective loans into 
RMBS trusts at the time they formed the trusts.  They also knew that 
default rates of loans from particular originators were particularly high, but 
they continued to accept loans from those originators.334  They were aware 
that appraisers were overstating the value of homes,335 so they knew that 
many loans could not satisfy the 80% test.  Members of the industry had to 
know these things before reporters became aware that the mortgages and 
notes had serious quality problems.  Even though REMICs have the 
opportunity to cure defective obligations within the ninety-day window,336 
nothing suggests that they took the steps necessary to cure defective 
obligations.  Due to the collapse of the residential real estate market as a 
result of the practices of RMBS sponsors, insufficient mortgages existed to 
replace defective obligations that the RMBS trusts held.  Sponsors colluded 
with originators to settle repurchase obligations instead of exercising trusts’ 
rights to cure defects by replacing defective obligations with compliant 
loans.337  No cure alternative would appear to help RMBS trusts principally 
secure their mortgage notes.  Many second-lien mortgage RMBS trusts will 
also fail to principally secure their mortgage notes. 
3. Secured By Real Property 
In addition to being principally secured, an obligation held by an 
RMBS trust must be secured by an interest in real property in order to 
 
practices and mentioning the sponsors’ willingness to shift the blame to their investors). 
 331.  See Bajaj, supra note 106 (demonstrating that sponsors securitized low quality 
mortgages by using Ownit as an example). 
 332.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(3)(iii). 
 333.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(f)(2). 
 334.  See supra text accompanying notes 137-140 (citing specific examples of sponsors 
recognizing the consistent poor quality of certain originators, yet continuing to work with 
them). 
 335.  See Bajaj, supra note 124. 
 336.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(f)(2). 
 337.  See J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 25–28 (alleging that 
sponsors were colluding with originators by using the quality control process to benefit 
originators). 
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come within the definition of qualified mortgage.338  The regulations do not 
define “secured by,” but they provide a list of instruments that are secured 
by interests in real property.  Those instruments include mortgages; deeds 
of trust; installment land contracts; mortgage pass-thru certificates 
guaranteed by GNMA, FNMA, FHLMC, or CMHC; other investment trust 
interests; and obligations secured by manufactured housing.339  Of those 
instruments, mortgages and deeds of trust would most often be the type of 
security applicable to an obligation held by an RMBS trust.  Practices of 
the mortgage securitization industry in the years leading up to the financial 
crisis in general, and the use of MERS in particular, suggest that RMBS 
trusts often did not hold mortgages or deeds of trust.  It also suggests that 
the mortgage securitization industry lacked the power to enforce them. 
In downstream litigation, courts in many states have considered 
who holds or controls the legal rights and obligations of mortgage notes 
and mortgages that are designated as RMBS trust property.340  The issues 
state courts have considered with respect to mortgage notes and mortgages 
include standing to foreclose,341 entitlement to notice of bankruptcy 
proceeding against a mortgagor,342 ownership of a mortgage note under a 
state’s commercial code, the right to initiate a nonjudicial foreclosure, and 
liability for recording fees.343  The outcomes of these cases vary from 
 
 338.  See I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A) (defining qualified mortgage as an obligation secured 
by an interest in real property). 
 339.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(5). 
 340.  Litigation in this area is moving quickly, so even work done a few years ago is not 
up to date.  Nonetheless, an early article with a nice overview of cases that consider state-
law issues associated with MERS recording is John R. Hooge & Laurie Williams, Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.: A Survey of Cases Discussing MERS’ Authority to 
Act, 8 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW ADVISOR 1, 1-21 (Aug. 2010) . 
 341.  See Ralph v. Met Life Home Loans, No. CV 2010-0200 (5th D. Idaho Aug. 10, 
2011) (holding that MERS was not the beneficial owner of a deed of trust, so its assignment 
was a nullity and the assignee could not bring a nonjudicial foreclosure against the 
borrower); Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 462 Mass. 569 (Mass. 2012) (holding that the 
definition of a mortgagee in state statutes governing foreclosure by sale refers to the person 
or entity holding the mortgage); Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 
487 (Minn. 2009) (holding that MERS, as nominee, could institute a foreclosure by 
advertisement, i.e., a nonjudicial foreclosure, based upon Minnesota “MERS statute” that 
allows nominee to foreclose); Fowler v. Recontrust Co., N.A., 2011 WL 839863 (D. Utah 
March 10, 2011) (holding that MERS is the beneficial owner under Utah law); Bain v. 
Metro. Mortg. Grp., Inc., 285 P.3d 34 (Wash. 2012) (holding that MERS was not a 
beneficiary under Washington Deed of Trust Act because it did not hold the mortgage note). 
 342.  See Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 2009) (holding that MERS 
had no interest in the property and was not entitled to notice of bankruptcy or to intervene to 
challenge it). 
 343.  See In re Kemp, 440 B.R. 624, 624 (D.N.J. 2010) (holding that bank was not 
considered a holder that could enforce debtor’s promissory note under New Jersey’s 
Uniform Commercial Code). 
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jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  Many cases pit a borrower against one or more 
banks or MERS.  Courts often rule in favor of the borrower, eliminating the 
rights of the bank to collect on a note or foreclose on property; in other 
cases, courts have found that banks have standing.344 
The outcomes of such cases often turn on whether the bank 
initiating a claim (or on whose behalf another party initiates a claim) holds 
both the mortgage note and the mortgage at the initiation of the claim.345  In 
some jurisdictions, courts allow banks to foreclose so long as they are the 
mortgagees; other jurisdictions require banks to have the note to initiate 
foreclosure.346  Banks in every jurisdiction can obtain rights to foreclosure 
through possession of the necessary documents.  Because timing of their 
rights is important for REMIC classification, obtaining those rights before 
initiating legal proceedings may not be sufficient for tax purposes. 
The inability to foreclose on an obligation calls into question 
whether the obligation was secured by real property.  REMICs, sponsors, 
originators, underwriters, and their advisors were put on notice as early as 
2001 that their security positions probably lacked legal support.  In 2001, 
the Attorney General of New York concluded that recording a MERS 
instrument violates New York real property law.347  Even though the New 
York Court of Appeals (the highest court in New York State) later ruled 
that the clerk had to record the MERS documents,348 that ruling put RMBS 
trustees and other industry participants on notice that purported REMICs 
may not be able to foreclose on mortgage notes that were part of a MERS 
securitization. 
Some commentators claim that an obligation is secured by an 
interest in real property if, after all of the agreements and rights have been 
enforced, the RMBS trust ends up with the collateral real property or the 
proceeds from the sale of that property (the ultimate-outcome argument).349  
They argue that an originator can transfer possession of a mortgage note 
and assign the mortgage to the purported REMIC before it attempts to 
 
 344.  See, Ebube Okoli, Bankruptcy Court Rules MERS Has Standing and the Customary 
Rights of a Mortgagee and May Act Under the Mortgage , REFINBLOG.COM (Aug. 8, 2013), 
http://www.refinblog.com  (indicating that of the cases analyzed through Mar. 11, 2014, 
courts held that MERS or the Bank had standing in 223 and lacked standing in 63, meaning 
that in more than 20% of cases, bank could not foreclose or collect on the note). 
 345.  See Bradley T. Borden, David J. Reiss & William KeAupuni Akina, Show Me the 
Note!, 19 BANK & LENDER LIABILITY 3 (June 3, 2013) (reviewing cases where party 
initiating foreclosure did not hold mortgage note at commencement of foreclosure). 
 346.  See generally Whitman & Milner, supra note 246 (commenting on the various 
requirements to initiate a foreclosure in different jurisdictions). 
 347.  See MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 83 (N.Y. 2006) (responding to 
claim that a MERS instrument cannot be recorded under New York law). 
 348.  See id. at 96. 
 349.  See PEASLEE & NIRENBERG, supra note 169, at 464–65. 
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enforce the mortgage note through payment collection efforts or 
foreclosure.350  Courts typically find in favor of a bank that holds the 
mortgage note and the mortgage prior to commencing a foreclosure action, 
but the outcome is much less predictable if the bank does not hold both 
instruments when the action commences.351  Thus, the possession of the 
note and ownership of the mortgage often affect the rights of an RMBS 
trust. 
The ultimate-outcome argument does not hold up under scrutiny.  
The REMIC rules provide that an obligation is not principally secured by 
an interest in real property if the obligation’s security is an interest in 
another obligation.352 The fact that a collateral obligation is secured by an 
interest in real property does not affect this analysis.353  If an RMBS trust 
holds an obligation from the originator and that obligation is secured by 
mortgage notes that the originator holds, the RMBS trust’s obligation is not 
principally secured by an interest in real property.  This result holds true 
even if interests in real property secure the originator’s mortgage notes.  
Consequently, if an RMBS trust does not own mortgage notes for tax 
purposes, but they own an obligation from the originator secured by the 
mortgage notes, the obligation that the RMBS trust holds will not be 
principally secured by an interest in real property.  This result obtains even 
though the RMBS trust may be able to foreclose on the originator’s 
mortgage notes, gain ownership and possession of them and the mortgage, 
and then foreclose on the underlying real estate.  The ultimate outcome of 
this series of events is the RMBS trust gaining the proceeds from the sale 
of real property.  However, the REMIC rules do not treat the RMBS trust 
as holding an obligation secured by an interest in real property. 
If the ultimate-outcome argument is not effective with respect to 
obligations secured by interests in real property, it should not be effective 
with respect to other obligations that require similar foreclosure actions.  
On this rationale, the ultimate-outcome argument should not apply to 
obligations that an RMBS trust cannot foreclose upon immediately.  If an 
RMBS trust must take action to compel an originator to transfer a mortgage 
note and mortgage in order to foreclose on property, the RMBS trust does 
not own an obligation principally secured by an interest in real property.  
The state of affairs leading up to the financial crisis indicated that most 
RMBS trusts could not foreclose on the homes securing their mortgage 
notes without taking additional steps.  Such steps would be similar to those 
 
 350.  See id. 
 351.  See generally Whitman & Milner, supra note 246 (noting the variation of outcomes 
when the entity initiating the foreclosure does not hold the promissory note). 
 352.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(6). 
 353.  See id. 
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a person would take if he or she held an obligation secured by another 
obligation that was secured by interests in real property.  Consequently, 
many RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, 
probably did not hold obligations secured by real property. 
The ability to timely foreclose is critical to the underlying purpose 
of the REMIC rules.  As stated above, the assets of a REMIC must remain 
static to enable an accurate accounting of the REMIC’s interest income and 
deductions.354  The inability to foreclose on the collateral of a loan impedes 
the static-asset objective.  If a REMIC can foreclose in a timely manner, it 
can restore the cash flow from the defaulted loan with a new loan or other 
eligible asset.355  If, however, the REMIC must go through numerous 
additional steps to foreclose, it loses a source of cash flow for the period of 
time it takes to complete those additional steps.  That loss will affect the 
computation of income and deduction related to the mortgage notes and 
interests in the REMIC.  Thus, the ability to foreclose immediately is at the 
heart of the REMIC rules, and the ultimate-outcome argument undermines 
a fundamental purpose of the rules.  Consequently, courts and the IRS 
should reject the ultimate-outcome argument. 
The ultimate-outcome argument links to the timing requirement.  
The relationship suggests that an obligation may be secured by an interest 
in real property on the date of acquisition, even if the holder of the 
obligation is unable to enforce the obligation or initiate foreclosure 
proceedings at that time.  In addition to ignoring the purposes of the 
REMIC rules, this point of view disregards the timing requirement, which 
generally requires the RMBS trust to hold the secured obligation on the 
REMIC startup date, but no later than three months thereafter.356  The 
inability to foreclose on a significant portion of the mortgage notes on the 
startup date (or within three months after it) indicates that many mortgage 
notes in RMBS trusts were not secured by interests in real property.  
Because the securitization process using MERS was inadequate, this 
problem probably applied equally to all types of RMBS trusts created in the 
years leading up to the financial crisis. 
 
 354.  See supra Part I.B. 
 355.  See I.R.C. § 860G(a)(4) (2012) (permitting a “qualified replacement mortgage” to 
be substituted for another obligation within three months of the startup day); Treas. Reg. § 
1.860G-2(f)(2) (as amended in 2011). 
 356.  See I.R.C. §§ 860D(a)(4), 860G(a)(3)(A) (2012) (stipulating the requirements for a 
“qualified mortgage”). 
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C. Timing Requirement 
To satisfy the timing requirement, an RMBS trust must hold 
qualified mortgages on a specific date keyed to the RMBS trust’s 
formation.  Generally, an obligation is a qualified mortgage only if: (1) the 
RMBS trust is the tax owner of the obligation on the startup date; or (2) 
within three months after the startup date, the RMBS trust purchases it.357  
Furthermore, an RMBS trust comes within the definition of REMIC only if 
it holds principally-secured obligations within three months after the 
startup date.358  The description above of lending and securitization 
practices reveals that RMBS trusts rarely had possession of mortgage notes 
or were mortgagees of record within three months after the startup date, 
much less on the startup date.359  The parties also probably failed to transfer 
tax ownership to the RMBS trusts within that time period.360  Finally, until 
an RMBS trust is mortgagee of record and has possession of the mortgage 
note, it will be unable, in some jurisdictions, to foreclose on the real 
property securing the mortgage notes,361 so its loans would not appear to be 
principally secured by an interest in real property within the required time 
period.  Thus, even if an RMBS trust takes some steps to cure defects in the 
securitization process after the three-month period expires, such efforts 
probably would not result in the RMBS trust owning an obligation that was 
principally secured by an interest in real property within the required time 
period.  The failure to own an obligation principally secured by real 
property within the required time period will cause many RMBS trusts to 
fail the timing requirement.  The failure would be equally applicable to a 
trust with second-lien mortgages. 
D. Substantially-All Requirement 
A trust satisfies the substantially-all requirement only if no more 
than a de minimis amount of the trust’s assets are prohibited assets (i.e., 
assets that are not qualified mortgages or permitted investments).362  A 
regulatory safe harbor provides that an RMBS trust satisfies the 
substantially-all test if the aggregate basis of the prohibited assets is no 
 
 357.  I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
 358.  I.R.C. § 860D(a)(4) (2012). 
 359.  See supra Part I.B-C. 
 360.  See supra Part II.A. 
 361.  See REFINBLOG, supra note 4. 
 362.  Treas. Reg. § 1.860D-1(b)(3)(i) (as amended in 1992). This article uses “prohibited 
asset” to refer to any asset that is not a qualified mortgage or permitted investment. 
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greater than 1% of the aggregate basis of all of the trust’s assets.363  If the 
aggregate basis of the prohibited assets exceeds the 1% threshold, the trust 
may nonetheless be able to demonstrate that it owns no more than a de 
minimis amount of prohibited assets.364  The regulations neither provide 
guidance regarding what a trust must do to demonstrate it owns less than a 
de minimis amount of prohibited assets nor do they provide a percentage 
beyond which the amount of prohibited assets would cease to be de 
minimis.  Nonetheless, with the 1% safe harbor and the overall tax 
accounting reasons for granting special tax treatment to REMICs,365 a de 
minimis amount of prohibited assets surely cannot exceed a small 
percentage of an RMBS trust’s total assets.  This article illustrates that a 
significant percentage of the assets of perhaps most RMBS trusts would not 
come within the definition of qualified mortgage, so perhaps most RMBS 
trusts formed in the years leading up to the financial crisis would have a 
difficult time meeting the substantially-all requirement.  The hypothetical 
second-lien RMBS trust would almost certainly fail the substantially-all 
requirement test. 
One might argue that if an RMBS trust is not the tax owner of a 
mortgage note, the basis of the note reduces both the numerator and the 
denominator for purposes of applying the substantially-all requirement.  
This theory is unfounded because it does not account for the trust owning 
some sort of asset.  Even if an RMBS trust’s assets are not qualified 
mortgages, an RMBS trust still holds some type of asset.  If an RMBS trust 
does not own qualified mortgages, the nature of the asset it does in fact 
own will likely depend upon the reason the asset fails to be a qualified 
mortgage.  The discussion above illustrates that even if an RMBS trust does 
not hold qualified mortgages, it could hold a loan from an originator or 
sponsor.  Consequently, for purposes of determining the portion of the 
trust’s assets that are prohibited assets, these reclassified assets would be a 
part of both the numerator and denominator.  If they are much greater than 
1% of the trust’s total assets, the trust will likely not come within the 
definition of a REMIC.  In many situations, reclassified assets appear to be 
a significant portion of the trust’s total holdings. 
For example: if an RMBS trust owns $50,000,000 in assets, but 
because of a failed securitization it is the tax owner of only $35,000,000 of 
mortgage notes.  The $15,000,000 balance of its assets could be an 
obligation from an originator.  The numerator, for purposes of applying the 
substantially-all requirement, would be the $15,000,000 obligation from the 
originator, and the denominator would include all $50,000,000 of the 
 
 363.  Treas. Reg. § 1.860D-1(b)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1992). 
 364.  Id. 
 365.  See supra Part II.B (setting forth accounting requirements for REMICs). 
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trust’s assets.  The percentage of prohibited assets would thus be 30% 
($15,000,000 divided by $50,000,000).  This computation does not exclude 
the $15,000,000 that results from the trust’s failure to be the tax owner of 
the mortgage notes. 
The discussion to this point has reviewed the state of affairs in the 
RMBS industry in the years leading up to the financial crisis.  It also 
demonstrates that many RMBS trusts most likely failed to satisfy the 
REMIC requirements and provided the legal basis for challenging REMIC 
classification.  Some RMBS trusts would have an almost impossible chance 
of convincing a court that they satisfied the requirements of the REMIC 
rules.  Thus, this Article has presented the legal reasons for challenging the 
REMIC classification of numerous RMBS trusts.  The next part of this 
Article presents the policy reasons for challenging the REMIC 
classification of many RMBS trusts. 
III. POLICY REASONS TO ENFORCE REMIC RULES 
At present, the IRS is probably not auditing REMICs or enforcing 
the REMIC rules.  Perhaps its reason for not challenging REMIC status at 
this time is that it is studying the issues, observing the outcome of the 
numerous actions against RMBS trusts, sponsors, and originators, and 
gathering better information to choose the appropriate trusts to challenge.  
If the IRS fails to act, private parties will eventually instigate qui tam or 
whistleblower actions that serve the same policy reasons that should 
compel IRS action.  Because REMICs did not file the correct returns and 
may have committed fraud, the statute of limitations for earlier years 
should remain open indefinitely,366 giving the IRS and other parties 
adequate time to pursue REMIC litigation after obtaining the necessary 
information.  Ultimately, the IRS should take action against these parties.  
Failure to do so deprives the government of significant tax revenue, tacitly 
sanctions illegal behavior, cedes control of tax enforcement decision-
making to private industry, disregards Congressional mandate, and relieves 
the tax bar of its obligation to help protect the tax system and prudently 
counsel RMBS sponsors and trustees. 
The private-label RMBS industry is huge.  At its peak in 2007, it 
held $2.2 trillion in outstanding securities.367  Large amounts of interest 
 
 366.  See I.R.C. § 6501(c)(2) (2012) (providing that the statute of limitations remains 
open indefinitely if a return is fraudulent); I.R.C. § 6501(c)(3) (2012) (providing that the 
statute of limitations remains open indefinitely if no return is filed).  But see I.R.C. § 
6501(g)(1) (2012) (providing that the statute of limitations does not remain open indefinitely 
if a tax corporation, in good faith, files a trust return). 
 367. Matthew Goldstein, The Amazing Shrinking Pile of Non-Agency Mortgage Debt, 
REUTERS, Mar. 8, 2013, available at 
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payments are likely to change hands on $2.2 trillion of RMBS.  At just 4%, 
the annual interest alone would be $88 billion.  REMIC rules ensure that 
RMBS investors and RMBS trustees properly account for that interest and 
pay tax on it.  RMBS sponsors’ failure to properly create REMICs caused 
them to be unable to account for interest inflow and interest outflow.  As a 
consequence, they most likely failed to report income due to the federal 
government, depriving it of billions of dollars of tax revenue. 
By overstating the value of mortgage notes, the parties to RMBS 
trusts understated the interest rates on those notes.  Because of the lack of 
sufficient collateral securing a mortgage note and borrowers’ lack of 
qualification, mortgage notes were worth much less than their stated value.  
Consequently, the stated interest of the note would be much less than the 
actual interest.  For example, if the face value of a mortgage note was 
$100,000 and the stated interest was 5%, the borrower would pay $5,000 of 
interest on the note.  If, however, the actual value of the mortgage note was 
$80,000, the $5,000 payment would represent a 6.25% interest rate.  A 
RMBS trust that reported interest income using the 5% rate would 
underreport income.  Therefore, if the interest deductions were otherwise 
appropriate, the RMBS trust would understate its taxable income.  
Additionally, the inability to maintain a static asset pool with the types of 
assets entering RMBS trusts and their poor quality would result in a 
miscalculation of phantom income, further depriving the government of tax 
revenues.368 
The IRS’s lack of enforcement in this area prior to the financial 
crisis contributed to the magnitude of the crash.369  If the IRS had audited 
RMBS trusts, it would have recognized the inadequacies of the 
securitization process, the poor quality of mortgage notes being securitized, 
and the lack of effort to cure defective mortgage notes.  Enforcement would 
have presented RMBS sponsors not only with the prospect of losing 
favorable tax classification for multiple-tranche RMBS products, but also 
would have threatened to expose their misdeeds to unsuspecting investors.  
Exposure would have ended the demand for shoddy RMBS products, 
which potentially would have placed sufficient market pressure on RMBS 
organizers and loan originators to clean up their acts.  Thus, the IRS could 
have helped deter the financial crisis.  Its continued failure to enforce 
 
http://blogs.reuters.com/unstructuredfinance/2013/03/08/the-amazing-shrinking-pile-of-non-
agency-mortgage-debt/. 
 368.  See supra text accompanying note 44 (explaining the difficulties in correctly 
calculating income for RMBS trusts). 
 369.  See Bradley T. Borden, Did the IRS Cause the Financial Crisis?, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bradley-t-borden/did-the-irs-cause-
the-fin_b_1972207.html (arguing that the IRS could have prevented the financial crisis by 
more actively policing REMICs). 
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REMIC rules empowers RMBS organizers and loan originators to repeat 
their actions using REMIC classification as a front for illegal action. 
The IRS has been slow to enforce the REMIC rules and clean up 
the RMBS industry.  Instead, the actions it has taken have benefitted many 
of the parties who caused the financial crisis.  On December 6, 2007, the 
IRS released Revenue Procedure 2007-72, which stated “it would not view 
loan modifications specifically made under these guidelines [framework to 
fend off foreclosure of subprime mortgages] as grounds to challenge the tax 
benefits held by REMICS . . . .”370  In October 2009, the IRS provided 
some flexibility for CRE loans held in a REMIC.  This was later followed 
by federal bank regulators encouraging lenders not to foreclose on 
delinquent CRE borrowers because of the economic downturn.371  On 
August 17, 2010, the IRS announced that it would not challenge the ability 
of REMICs “to claim certain loans as ‘qualified mortgages’ even if they no 
longer meet the specific requirements of such loans under tax code Section 
860.”372  These IRS actions were not directed at the heart of the problem, 
but rather appear to accommodate the parties who caused the financial 
crisis. 
At least one commentator worries that taxing REMICs will unduly 
harm investors.373  The sponsors’ failure to adequately structure REMICs, 
with no enforcement of the laws, has harmed investors.  And sponsors’ 
failure to structure the arrangements to obtain favorable tax treatment also 
harms the investors because the tax exposure reduces the value of the 
REMIC interests.  Investors should be able to recover that lost value from 
the sponsors, so the tax burden, which represents revenue properly 
belonging to U.S. taxpayers, should fall upon the wrongdoers who 
organized these shams and misrepresented their quality to investors.  
Furthermore, the IRS may be able to impose transferee liability on the 
sponsors who transferred mortgage notes worth far less than the 
consideration received and collect any taxes and penalties not covered by 
the value of RMBS trusts’ assets. 
 
 370.  Alison Bennett, IRS Reassures REMICs It Will Not Challenge Tax Status if 
Subprime Loans Are Modified, 89 BBR 948 (Dec. 10, 2007). 
 371.  Richard Cowden, Securitizers Gearing up from ‘CMBS 2.0’ In a Market Where 
Demand Outstrips Supply, 3 REAL EST. L. & INDUS. REP. 474 (Jul. 13, 2010). 
 372.  Mortgages in REMICs Under Section 860 Will Not Be Challenged, According to 
IRS, 3 REAL EST. L. & INDUS. REP. 608 (Aug. 24, 2010). 
 373.  See Victor Fleischer, Why a Tax Crackdown Is Not Needed on Mortgage-Backed 
Securities, N. Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 25, 2012), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/21/why-a-tax-crackdown-is-not-needed-on-mortgage-
backed-securities/?nl=business&emc=edit_dlbkpm_20121121 (arguing that taxing REMICs 
would pass liability to investors who would sue various mortgage intermediaries and 
“further gum[] up the market for mortgage-backed securities”). 
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The IRS’s unwillingness to enforce the REMIC rules cedes control 
to private industry, which is aware of and abuses its position of power.  As 
one commentator noted, 
They take aggressive positions, and they figure that if enough of 
them take an aggressive position, and there’s billions of dollars at 
stake, then the IRS is kind of estopped from arguing with them 
because so much would blow up. And that is called the Wall 
Street Rule. That is literally the nickname for it.374 
Industry experts who made rules as they went along now invoke 
the Wall Street Rule.  An author of the leading REMIC treatise is credited 
with saying that “even if the IRS finds wrongdoing, it may be loath to act 
because of the wide financial damage the penalties would cause.”375  Such 
patent recognition of IRS impotence is frightening and threatens to 
undermine not only the tax system but also the already tenuous ideal of 
treating taxpayers equally.  The IRS should not cede control to private 
parties.  If the IRS had audited in the years leading up to the financial 
crisis, it could have prevented the problem in the first place and would not 
have to take action now that could potentially cause financial damage. 
If the concern is that enforcement at this time will cause wide 
financial damage, this article should help alleviate that concern.  The IRS 
could focus on low-hanging fruit, such as second-lien mortgage RMBS 
trusts that claimed to be REMICs.  Second-lien mortgage RMBS trusts 
formed in the years leading up to the financial crisis almost certainly will 
not satisfy the REMIC requirements.  Proving a case against them will be 
very possible for the IRS.  Also, second-lien mortgage RMBS issuances 
were comparatively small, with about $60 billion in 2005.376  Financial 
damage to the world economy will not result from challenging the tax 
classification of second-lien mortgage RMBS trusts.  The trusts will owe 
taxes and penalties, and the parties will have to determine the ultimate 
liability for those taxes and penalties.  Under a transference liability theory, 
 
 374.  Lee Sheppard, Bain Capital Tax Documents Draw Mixed Reaction, ALL THINGS 
CONSIDERED, (NPR Business broadcast Aug. 28, 2012) (discussing taxation of private 
equity management compensation), available at 
http://www.npr.org/player/v2/mediaPlayer.html?action=1&t=1&islist=false&id=160196045
&m=160201502. 
 375.  See Scott J. Paltrow, IRS Weighs Tax Penalties on Mortgage Securities, REUTERS 
(Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/27/us-usa-mbs-taxes-
idUSTRE73Q7UX20110427. 
 376. Second-Lien MBS Issuance up Sharply in 2005 Despite Slowdown in HELOC 
Securitization, INSIDE MBS & ABS (Mar. 31, 2006), 
http://www.insidemortgagefinance.com/issues/imfpubs_ima/2006_13/news/1000003501-
1.html. 
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that liability could rest with the RMBS sponsors or loan originators—the 
parties most responsible for the financial crisis.   
After pursuing second-lien mortgage RMBS trusts, the IRS could 
evaluate the results and decide whether they should make a case with 
respect to other types of RMBS trusts and pursue further action against 
them.  IRS enforcement, even with respect to a portion of the RMBS 
market, will help the IRS develop further expertise in this area and enable it 
to use the expertise to develop better audit and enforcement practices.  The 
IRS could use those improved skills to help prevent a catastrophe similar to 
the one that caused the financial crisis.  Enforcement would also reestablish 
the IRS as the police power in this area and take back that function from 
Wall Street.  Finally, enforcement in this area would bring other viewpoints 
and voices to lawmaking in this area. 
The IRS’s inaction also damages the tax system in a more general 
way.  The tax bar traditionally has accepted some responsibility for 
upholding the integrity of the tax system.  Members of the bar do this by 
ensuring that advice they give reflects the highest standards and that they 
do not participate in transactions that violate the law.  This article illustrates 
that a significant percentage of RMBS trusts probably do not satisfy the 
REMIC requirements, but RMBS organizers treated them as REMICs.  
Some RMBS trusts appear to have almost no chance of satisfying the 
requirements.  Nonetheless, “will” tax opinion letters accompanied RMBS 
offering materials.  A will opinion is the authors’ assurance that the RMBS 
trust has a 95% chance of prevailing on the merits should the IRS challenge 
the classification.377  The authors of will opinions qualify them by 
providing that they are reliable only if the securitization occurs as described 
in the offering materials.378  Despite that qualifier, opinion authors should 
be accountable for inaccurate opinions to the extent that they were aware of 
the RMBS problems.  As industry participants who were close to the 
action, they probably knew about many of the problems that existed.379  
Because of the Wall Street Rule and IRS inaction, they continued to issue 
unsupported opinions.  If the IRS does not enforce the REMIC rules, 
members of the bar arguably will feel no greater obligation to abide by the 
rules.  Consequently, the IRS’s inaction causes exponential damage to the 
tax system as a whole. 
 
 377.  See Robert P. Rothman, Tax Opinion Practice, 64 TAX LAW. 301, 312 (Winter 
2011) (stating that “will” opinion has no material chance of being wrong). 
 378.  See id. at 367. 
 379.  See Complaint, supra note 7, available at 
https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/fbem/DocumentDisplayServlet?documentId=4EP2AF38l3ql/
RHTZ6TMYQ==&system=prod (revealing that attorneys and accounting firms were aware 
of the securitization deficiencies). 
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Finally, IRS inaction is an affront to the law that grants favorable 
tax treatment to only certain types of RMBS trusts.  This offends many 
commentators who believe that the IRS should not exercise such discretion 
but should enforce the laws as created by Congress.380  Furthermore, the 
detailed rules in the REMIC regime address specific purposes,381 and a 
failure to enforce the rules undermines those purposes.  Consequently, 
significant policy supports the IRS challenging REMIC classification of at 
least some RMBS trusts.  If the IRS fails to take action, it must accept 
responsibility for the resulting financial harm. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue of REMIC failure is important in at least four contexts: 
(1) in any potential effort by the IRS to clean up the industry and collect tax 
and penalties from organizations that did not satisfy the REMIC 
requirements; (2) in civil lawsuits brought by REMIC investors against 
sponsors, underwriters, and other parties who pooled mortgages and sold 
mortgage-backed securities; (3) to state and federal prosecutors who may 
consider bringing criminal or civil fraud claims against sponsors, 
underwriters, and other parties who pooled mortgages and sold RMBS; and 
(4) to private parties who know of specific abuse and may bring qui tam or 
whistleblower action against purported REMICs.  This article provides a 
roadmap for pursuing tax enforcement action against RMBS trusts.  It 
illustrates that many RMBS trusts, perhaps the majority of them, formed in 
the years leading up to the financial crisis could not satisfy the REMIC 
requirements.  Instead of advocating action against all such trusts, however, 
the IRS should consider bringing action against RMBS trusts that fail to 
satisfy the REMIC requirements.  A logical starting point would therefore 
be an examination of RMBS trusts comprised of second-lien mortgage 
notes.  Findings and results of such actions would inform the IRS about 
whether it should expand the scope of its efforts.  Both law and policy 
support this action, so continued inaction is unacceptable. 
 
 
 
 380.  See, e.g., Yves Smith, IRS Likely to Expand Mortgage Industry Coverup by 
Whitewashing REMIC Violations, NAKED CAPITALISM (Apr. 28, 2011), 
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/04/irs-likely-to-expand-mortgage-industry-coverup-
by-whitewashing-remic-violations.html#sdR8UXJzAHLIllVG.99 (arguing that the IRS 
employs a “nothing to see here” strategy regarding widespread violations of REMICs rules 
to avoid “blow[ing] up the mortgage industrial complex” and reigniting the financial crisis). 
 381.  See supra Part I. 
